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INTRODUCTION 
This essay is an atte:rnpt to get well acquainted with -Stephen 
Pepper's conception of the nature and methods of metaphysics. ·· It is 
written in a dissertational style because the object here is to es-
tablish an arguable view of metaphysics through giving a careful 
analysis and criticism of Mr. Pepper's position. 
Professor Pepper's metaphysics is unusual. He begins formulating 
it by describing what he beli.eves the "general cognitive situation" to 
be. This involves introducing II · II the idea of common-sense fact, a 
concept which is basic to his position. Delineation of this material 
into its "traits" sets the tone for much of his later work. Co:rrnnon,,, 
sense facts are the uncritical "stuff" of everyday experience. This 
is the subject-matter for metaphysical investigation. Common-sense 
facts are secure in that they are never lacking; th::Ls trait puts a 
limit on skepticism. These "facts" are cognit:ively disorganized and 
lack cri ti.cism; they urge the serious knower to complete their refi.ne ~ 
ment yet they prevent, if they are heeded, the pitfall of dogmatism. 
Contained in this uncritical material are numerous bases for guiding 
insights, or "root metaphors" which enable us to develop various 
schemes through which the world of co:rni"ll.On-sense facts may be inter·-
preted, 
Professor Pepper 1 s system culminates i.n his discussion of "world 
hypotheses" which are metaphysical theories generated from root 
1 
2 
metaphors. These theories attempt to include the entire world within 
their explanative reach. The unique aspect of this result is Pepper's 
belief that there are four relatively equal world theories. This is 
in sharp contrast with the outlook of many metaphysicians who advocate 
that only one metaphysical theory is adequate. Because of this position 
Pepper endorses a form of eclecticism which incorporates submitting 
individual problems to each of the relatively equal world theories, 
noting their individual solutions, then proceeding as rationally as 
possible while treating each solution proferred as being as well 
grounded as the others. 
Since much of Pepper's academic life (he was born in 1891) spans 
a period of strong anti-metaphysical inclination among some profession-
al philosophers, one easily notes in his work many attempts to justify 
metaphysics as an intellectually respectable enterprise. His position 
is perhaps somewhat distorted in places because of this defense. 
This essay is not intended as a discussion of every point raised 
by Mr. Pepper's views on metaphysics. Accomplishing that kind of task 
would take more time and erudition than this humble amateur has to 
command. In one sense, Professor Pepper's metaphysical position has 
not yet reached its complete fruition since his latest work in this 
area is still in preparation. 1 
The goal for this paper is threefold. It i s hoped that the 
summaries of Pepper's views will amount to a correlation of his 
1concept and Q,uali ty, to be published by Open Court as the thir-
teenth volume in the Paul Carus Lecture Series (expected sometime in 
1967), is Pepper's latest book containing additional work in meta-
physics. The only parts of that material available for this essay was 
a summary of parts of it which appeared in ~ Monist, XLVII (1963), 
pp. 267-286. 
3 
opinions on metaphysics which are somewhat scattered through various 
publications. Second, several criticisms of points of special interest 
will be offered along the way. Finally, in the course of criticism and 
in the conclusion, several reflections upon metaphysics and Peppe.r's 
position will be presented. 
CHAPTER I 
COMMON SENSE 
Professor Pepper considers the appropriate method for seeking 
knowledge to be corroboration "which is nothing more than the method 
f th . d . . . d 111 o ga ering an organizing evi ence, This method involves first 
accepting the importance of hypotheses, all of which originate among 
uncriticized and alterable facts. The term "facts" is not essential 
here; one may use any other term one pleases if he remembers that he is 
not thereby denoting unalterable entities. It is possible that our 
preceptions feelings, and immediacies are exactly what we perceive, 
feel, and intuit them to be. But to assume certainty in these matters 
would be dogmatic (see below, p. 19). If one desires to be undog-
matic, one must be prepared to change his mind about the reliability of 
any evidence whatever. J{ypotheses are not guaranteed by uncriticized 
facts; these two cooperate to substantiate each other. 2 The central 
point here is that knowledge does not begin with certainties. It 
begins with something which is alterable and open to critical 
1stephen C. Pepper, "Metaphysical Method, 11 The Philosophical 
Review LII {194 3), p. 256 [ subsequent references to this article will 
be cited as 11MM11 ]. Also on this point cf. Stephen C. Pepper, 11The 
Root Metaphor Metaphor Theory of Metaphysics" [hereinafter referred to 
as 11RTM11 ], The Journal of Philosophy, XXXII (1935), pp. 365-366. On 
p. 367 Pepper refers to his method as the method of hypothesis. 
2The foregoing is adapted from RTM, p. 367. 
4 
interpretation. 
Thus, Pepper is led to distinguish two broad types of evidence: 
3 
uncriticized and criticized (or refined) evidence. Knowledge beginp 
5 
with the formerand passes into the latter. He often refers to uncriti-
cized evidence· as "common sense."4 No term is completely satisfactory 
because what one wishes to denote is something precritical. In several 
instances Professor Pepper has attempted to describe what he wishes 
"uncriticized evidence" to denote. 5 In order to get a clear idea of 
his intent for this concept, it will be worthwhile to quote at. length 
some of his examples. 
Uncriticized, common-sense facts are the sort of things 
we think of when we ordinarily read the daily papers or novels 
depicting the ordinary life of men or the sort of things we 
see and hear and smell and feel as we walk along the street or 
in the country: that is, the sound of a bird; it is three 
thousand miles across the continent; trains run every day on 
schedule, except in case of accident; there is space and there 
i.s time; the laws of nature have to quite a degree been dis-
covl;?red by scientists and the world runs according to them and 
scientists can predict by means of them; astronomers can pre-
dict eclipses with perfect accuracy; dreams are not true; 
three is a lucky number; i.t is perhaps :wiser not to go under 
a iadder ). because paint or something migb.t fall on one; God 
exists quite certainly, or at least, probably; science says 
that I am made up of chemicals; my soul may be immortal; I 
3stephen C. Pepper, World H,ypotheses (Los Angeles, 1942), p, 39 
. [ subsequent references to this book will be abbreviated ''1,m"J ·. 
4v. Stephen C. Pepper, 11The Quest for Ignorance or the Reasonable 
Limits of Skepticism" [ subsequently referred to as "QI"], The 
Philosophical Review, XLV (1936), p. 130. Pepper uses "middle-sized 
f t 11 · f " · t · · d · d " H t th + h . . ac s as a synonym .or uncri icize evi ence. e asser s a,., is 
"· . " . Pl t ' II • • " . th t . t i " • II common sense is a ,o s opinion, or. e pragma is s experience, 
or Loewenberg 1 s "pre-analytical data." For the latter see Jacob 
Loewenberg, Reason. and ~ Nature .2f Things (The Paul Carus Lectures 
for 1953 [LaSalle, 1959]), p.· 130. 
5cf'.. WH, p, 39; QI, pp; 130-131; RTM, pp. 367.,.368; MM, p. 254. 
The table of 11Evidential Items" given in the latter includes :mari..y 'kinds 
of uncriticized evidence. 
can make free choices; pleasures are good and pains are bad; 
do to others as you would be done by; turn the other cheek; an 
eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth; men are born equal; the 
best man wins; bigamists are immoral) unless they are Turks; 
Turks are funny people and probably i:rhmoral--and so on. Some-
thing lige this is the material of present-day common sense in 
America.• 
The :nnnimum of acceptable fact and knowledge is 
not ... the mock humility of a cardinal who lays aside for a 
brief ceremony his robes of cloth and gold and washes with 
his own hands the already well washed feet of a beggar. It 
is the genuine humbleness of the great rabble of beggars 
themselves who live and do not know why they live, nor how 
long they will live) nor what they will live upon. But they 
live. I refer to the cups and spoons on these tables) the 
lumps of sugar) the chairs) the pieces of perspective) the 
cough) the sneeze, the warmth) the sound, and) if there is 
sense) the sense of these words, the sense of Stanford 
University) and this room) in this building) on this campus, 
in these United States, in the world) your breathing your 
smiles) and the feelings behind your smiles--all these 
things for you and for me and for thousands and millions. 
These are the ragged facts or ragged bits of knowledge a 
freshman cannot escape from--nor you nor I with all our 
superior learning.7 
Pepper ascribes three traits to material of this sort, the first 
being that common-sense facts are not known with definiteness and gen-
erally not knowable definitely. 8 Any attempt to describe or specify 
common sense in detail carries us out of that material into criticized 
evidence. Any item fitting into the heading of common-sense fact is 
evidence) but not evidence having an indubitable nature, It is a fact 
of a sort which generally cannot be described with definiteness. 
Common sense facts are not definitively known and probably cannot, by 
6WH, pp. 39-40. 
7QI, pp. 129-130 . 
. 
8WH) pp. 40-42. cf. Stephen C, Pepper 11Middle-Sized F'acts/ 1 
University of California Publications in Philosophy, XIV (1932), 
pp. 13-14 [ this article will be referred to as 11MSF'11 ] • 
6 
their nature, be so known. Indeed, that trait alone distinguishes 
common-sense fact from critical fact. Ignoring that difference would 
amount to ignoring some available evidence. 9 
Security is a second trait of common-sense facts. 10 This means 
that although no one knows exactly what these facts are we can 1 t get 
away from them. They are the matrix of all knowing. We are so 
7 
immersed in them that we normally miss their significance. The special-
ist does not often notice them because he has made assumptions that 
raise him above them. Critical cognitions of them may come and go, 
but they will still insist on being known, equally for the beggar as 
for the wise man. Common-sense material is not stable, in that what 
may be part of it in one epoch or culture may not persist; or new items 
may be absorbed into its realm. Its security lies in that it is never 
lacking. "No cognition can sink lower than common sense, for when we 
completely give up trying to know. anything, then is precisely when we 
know things in the common-sense way. In that lies the security of 
1111 
common sense. 
The third trait of common sense is what Pepper calls its cog-
nitive irritability. 12 As a man seeking complete knowledge, the more 
9From QI, p. 131, one finds this further conrrnent: 11 .. [That the 
distinction between fact and description does not appear in discussing 
common-sense facts] is very annoying to the specialist. With some 
justification he objects to my even using the word 1 fact 1 to refer to 
these things. Let him use any word he wants. He will find every pre-
cise word a misnomer, because precision is just what these things do 
not have. Precision comes from. analysis and criticism, and, precisely, 
middle-sized facts are pre-analytical and uncritical. 11 
lOWH, pp. 42-43; QI, pp. 130-131. cf. MSF, pp. 16-17. 
llWH, p. 43. 
12 WH, pp. 43-44. cf. MSF, pp. 14-15. 
8 
one is aware of common sense the less he likes it) for the materials of 
com.mon sense are irresponsible. The serious student feels responsible 
to truth and principle) but common sense accepts then ignores the law 
of contradiction; it mutually asserts a fact and its contrary; it 
capriciously possesses both clarity and vagueness. This unreliability 
and irresponsibility is the source of its irritation to one who is pur-
suing critical knowledge. Because of its lack of definitiveness and 
its doubtability) Pepper prefers to call a common-sense fact (or an 
item of uncriticized evidence) a dubitandum. 
Besides not being capable of accurate characterization (trait 
one)) dubitanda exhibit "degrees of vagueness) or what is the same 
thing) degrees of accuracy of discrimination."13 Pepper articulates 
this point by claiming that the same middle-sized fact is capable of a 
number of descriptions of various degrees of vagueness. Each descrip-
is made possible by a corresponding hypothesis. As an hypothesis is 
used to describe more and more dubitanda) the accuracy of the descrip-
tions will increase. A description which is better than others will 
"go deeper into a fact" (presumably this metaphor refers to lack of 
vagueness) and connect that fact with a number of other facts. · "There 
is thus a hierarchy of middle-sized facts--from the vaguest) most 
inarticulate) most isolated to the clearest) most articulate, most 
interconnected. 1114 This notion seems to be close in meaning to the 
II II II II . . 
concepts of rough data and rough danda which are developed in 
World Hypot~ri~sEos (see below p. 42) . Pepper also thinks that within 
13MSF) p. 14 . 
14MS· F 14 ) p. . 
·' ,, ( . • · .. '·~··· .. ;l . : il~ • 
the same level of vagueness or discrimination, a middle-sized fact is 
capable of a number of alternative descriptions depending upon which 
15 
one of a number of available hypotheses is used. 
9 
There are some difficulties concealed in Pepper's notion df comm.on-
sense facts having t.raits. For one thing, it is paradoxical that dubi-
tanda are not generally definitively known, yet possess at least three 
definite traits. Secondly, dubitanda are said to be variable and 
16 
amorphous, but giving traits to comm.on-sense material seems to in-
valve believing just the opposite. Pepper has not made it completely 
clear whether he meant the traits to be characteristics which dubitanda 
have in and of their very nature, but some of his discussions give this 
impression. 17 So if dubitanda are to be amorphous and unstructured, it 
would not be consistent to say later that they have traits which are 
aspects of their nature as dubitanda. If Pepper did not mean for the 
traits to be aspects of a dubitandum in its own nature, then it is not 
clear what the significance of the traits is to be. Finally, Pepper 
gives the impression, throughout his discussion of comm.on-sense facts, 
that he is describing the situation as it is; furthermore, he believes 
his description of common sense-facts to bie correct. He has pointed 
. out that there are no descriptions in the absence of an hypothesis. 
What is lacking here, then, is Pepper's hypothesis through which he is 
describing common-sense material. 
Part of the hypothesis which Pepper has not stated would have to 
15MSF, p. 16. 
16MSF, p . 11. 
l7v. MSF, fl· 11, p. 13. The word 11trait 11 itself carries the 
connotation of 1defini te characteristic.; 11 
10 
deal with the means by which one has knowledge of dubitanda. He states 
that there are elaborate world hypotheses which relate how we come to 
have refined knowledge. He does not offer a theory about how one comes 
' to have knowledge of dubitanda. Dubitanda deserve the designation 
11 11 knowledge, 18 This much is explicit in his work. How that title is 
earned is a mystery. On the important question of the knowledge-
situation at the dubitanda level. Pepper offers no comment. 
Perhaps Pepper is arguing this way (there is good evidence that he 
is--see WH, pp. 319-320): the most reliable thing in life is that we 
have experience; we don 1 t know precisely what the nature of experience 
is, but it is highly confirmed that we have experience; individual com-
ponents of experience (dubitanda) are each dubitable, variable, indefi-
nitely known, vague, etc., but the mass of all this prerefined, pre-
analytical material i.s what all knowledge starts from and it (as a mass) 
is the very secure base of all knowledge. This argument does not 
remove the difficulties noted above. Pepper declares that we don 1 t 
know precisely what the nature of experience is, then asserts that it 
is composed of individual dubitanda having distinguishable and describ-
able traits. He proclaims that the mass of dubitanda is the very 
secure base of knowledge, but he fails to show how one has knowledge of 
them either individually or as a whole. This last statement is not 
meant as a denial that the mass of dubitanda constitutes knowledge; it 
only inquires how the designation 11 11 knowledge came to be earned, 
The concepts associated with common sense have a central function 
in Professor Pepper 1 s approach to metaphysics. Dubitanda appear as the 
18WH, pp. 319-320. 
11 
II • !I • h" h given in is approac . They are the basis of all knowledge. Common 
sense facts offer a source for the categories of world theories; they 
save philosophy from utter skepticism, they rescue philosophy from dog-
matism.19 Showing how all this works out in Pepper 1 s position is the 
subject of the next three chapters of this essay. 
19 
MSF, pp. 27-28. 
CHAPTER II 
DOGMATISM AND SKEPTICISM 
Professor Pepper is very interested in determining whether there is 
any knowledge about which one may be completely certain. If there were 
propositions which one knew with certainty to be true, that would con-
travene his belief that all knowledge has its beginning among the dubi-
tanda of corrnnon sense. If there are indubitable propositions, know-
ledge will begi.n from them; dubi tanda would lose their central impor-
tance. He attempts to di.scredi t the possibility of certain knowledge 
in his discussion of dogmatism. 
He also wants to show that there is a limit for the lengths to 
which doubt may reasonably be pushed. If unlimited doubt were. possible, 
he thinks there would be no knowledge. Pepper 1 s treatment of skepticism 
is designed to show that unrestrained doubt is not a reasonable posi-
tion, no matter how one interprets it. 
Analysis of Belief 
Professor Pepper begins his examination of dogmatism with an 
analysis of the structure of belief. 1 In .each instance of belief there 
are three constituents: a content, an attitude_, and the grounds. ''Con-
tent" refers to what one believes or disbelieves. The content of belief 
1 
WH, p. 11. 
12 
13 
II in those terms seems to be equivalent to the logician's term propo-
sition. 11 One's attitude towa:rd the content of a belief is a matter of 
degree. An attitude may vary from the positive extreme of certainty to 
the negative extrewe of complete disbelief. Mid-way between these two 
extremes is the center position, of suspended judgement or unbelief. 
The intensity of one's attitude corresponds to how far (in either 
direction) from unbelief one's position on the scale is located. The 
grounds for belief consist of whatever evidential items are available 
in support of the content. These three factors taken together (content 
attitude, grounds) are what Pepper calls belief in the broad sense. 
Belief in the narrow sense as contrasted with disbelief and unbelief, 
is a matter of attitude in response to content. In these terms Pepper 
describes a reasonable man as 
... one whose attitude in respect to content is guided by 
the groun~s of belief. If the grounds weigh heavily for the 
content, he will believe; if against it, he will disbelieve; 
if evenly on either side, he will maintain an attitude of 
suspense and unbelieve. Moreover) he will seek to make his 
attitude exactly proportional to the balance of weight in 
the grounds of belief .... [Furthermore, he will be] eager 
to find more grounds for belief if more are available, and to 
modify his attitude constantly in relation to these. 2 
The dogmatist is one whose attitude toward the content of a belief 
is not in proportion to the grounds for that belief. He is one who 
believes) or unbelieves, or disbelieves too much in terms of the 
grounds for belief. · 11 Moreover, a dogmatist often begins as a reason-
man; but having struck an attitude, he resists the search for new 
grounds, and even when these are presented he refuses to change his 
2 WH, pp, 12-13. 
14 
attitude accordingly."3 Thus, according to Pepper, a belief in the 
narrow sense is cognitively justified only when one's attitude toward 
the content is appropriate to all the available relevant evidence, in-
eluding the further proviso that one's attitude must remain open to 
revision in the presence of new grounds. 
Criticism of Pepper's Analysis of Belief 
Pepper's analysis of belief is lacking in clarity. Belief-in-the-
narrow-sense is not adequately differentiated from belief-in-the-
broad-sense, while the latter notion has hardly been defined at all. 
Another problem is the ambiguity surrounding his use of "attitude. 11 It 
too lacks clear ~efinition. Before talking about some of the logical 
difficulties, it will be advisable to attempt a clarification of the 
concepts mentioned above. 
Presumably, belief-in-the-narrow-sense means that state of mind in 
which complete trust, confidence, or reliance is placed in the truth of 
a proposition. If this be appropriate, then the other elements of 
belief-in-the-broad-sense can be defined in terms of it. Attitude 
apparently has reference only to the state of mind or mental feeling in 
general, no matter what degree or intensity it may exhibit. This state 
of mind is capable of ranging from complete trust when one is certain 
something is true (this state called belief, narrow sense), to a lack 
of a feeling of either trust or distrust (the case of unbelief or SUS·· 
pended judgement), to complete trust in the falsity of a proposition 
(the state of mind called disbelief) . Thus, attitude can be represented 
3WH, p, 13. ct RTM, pp. 365-366. 
15 
on a scale •. 
disbelief Unbelief Belief 
One's attitude or state of mind can be located on this scale depending 
on the amount of intensity of one's trust or reliance in the truth of 
the proposition under consideration. The location of one's degree of 
attitude on this scale is, in the case of a reasonable man, to be deter-
mined by the grounds for the truth or falsity of the content. If this 
enlargement and clarification of Pepper's terminology is in line with 
his intentions, it would seem that belief-in-the-broad-sense means 
nothing more than the act or process of judging on the basis of the 
grounds, what is the appropriate degree of attitude for the particular 
proposition under consideration. 
There are several. problems with Pepper's analysis of belief whi.ch 
a mere clarification of terms does not resolve. For example, it is not 
clear how probabilities are to be handled, In the case of a proposition 
X whose probability of being true is 75 per cent, one might adopt a 
1:itate of mind which exhibits @ 75 per cent confidence, trust, or reli-
ance in the truth of the content; or one could conceivably adopt a state 
of' mind which exhibits complete trust and confidence in the truth of the 
content "Proposition X has a 75 per cent chance of being true. 11 The 
latter interpretation is probably objectionable to Pepper because it 
involves accepting a certainty which, it will be seen, he thinks cannot 
be maintained legitimately. The former interpretation, to be workabl.eJ 
needs a criterion for determining one's degree of confidence, trust, 
and reliance in a content's truth. That is, it requires a criterion by 
which one determines whether one's intensity of attitude is at the 75 
16 
per cent mark. No appropriate criterion is provided by Pepper. 
Another question develops about suspended judgement, or "unbelief.," 
Unbelief is a state of mind or attitude wherein there is a lack of 
trust or confidence (either pro or con) for the truth of the content; 
or unbelief is the state of mind wherein one exhibits conflicting con-
fidence both for and against the content so that the confidence felt 
for the truth of the content "balances" the confidence felt for the con-
tent 1 s falsity. Unbelief is the appropriate attitude to adopt for 
cases in which there is either a complete absence of grounds or the 
grounds are equally balanced pro and con. If one would apply Pepper's 
rule concerning cases for which unbelief is proper, one would eventu-
ally require a standard for judging whether the grounds are equally 
balanced. One would also need a means for determining whether there is 
a complete absence of grounds. Pepper has thus far failed to provide a 
method of discovering whether a particular item proposed as evidence 
for a content actually is evidence for that content. Also neglected is 
a standard for II II balanced grounds. 
One other difficulty is Pepper's omission of a cri teri.on which 
would establish that one 1 s degree of confidence in a content is in 
consonance with what one thinks the grounds to be. The central theme 
of Pepper 1 s description of dogmatism is that it is cognitively ille-
gitimate to adopt a state of mind which exhibits an excessively intense 
confidence in the truth of the content, the grounds being too weak to 
support that level of intensity. How can we avoid being dogmatic (a 
state of mind wherein one's confidence in the content is too great in 
view of the grounds) if we have no technique for assuring ourselves 
that our degree of trust is appropriate to the grounds of which we are 
17 
aware? 
Unacceptable Grounds For Belief 
Infallibility and Certainty. If a man is called a dogmatist he is 
judged so because he puts too much confidence in a content in reference 
to the grounds. This is Pepper's formulation of dogmatism in the ab-
stract. As seen in the previous section, there are some difficulties 
in applying the abstract formulation of dogmatism. Pepper attempts to 
circUll).vent some of these shortcomings by pointing out some specific 
types of grounds in which men have often placed too much confidence. 
The thrust of his argument at this point shifts from an attempt to 
understand the nature of dogmatism in general. The point he wants to 
make now is that if anyone claims that material of a specific type is 
grounds for a belief, then he is a dogmatist. Being a dogmatist of 
course means that in some manner one 1 s belief is not adequately 
supported by evidence. Let us review this point once more because it 
is an important one. There are particular types of material (for the 
sake of brevity let us call this cl.ass of material D) such that i.f one 
only uses items from Das the grounds for a belief, one is a dogmatist 
because no D-item can be evidence for any belief. What follows summa-
rizes Pepper's opinion about the nature of the class D. 
The first of several dogmatic standards which Pepper rejects is 
. 4 infallible authority. His argument against using infallible authority 
as a legitimate ground for belief is based on this evidence: (1) au-
thorities. which ,claim to be infallible often contradict each other or 
4 WH, p. 19. 
18 
contradict themselves; (2) the competence of an infallible authority is 
often questioned in terms of other cognitive criteria (e.go scientific 
method); (3) whenever infallible authority is questioned, the defender 
of dogma appeals to other more legitimate criteria. In the event in-
fallible authorities contradict themselves or one another, there is a 
loss of the claim of infallibility. When infallible authorities are 
questioned successfully by using other more legitimate cognitive 
criteria, the particular infallible source either is discredited or it 
defends itself by. appealing to criteria which are more legitimate than 
infallible authority. Furthermore, whether the claim for an authority 1 s 
infal],ibility is discredited by inner contradictions or outside attacks, 
one single particular case of failure by a well-acknowledged supposedly 
infallible authority is sufficient to discredit placing one 1 s reliance 
in any authority claiming infallibility for support of one 1 s position. 
"Infallibility is put forward as an absolute security against doubt. 
If a good instance of infallibility has once failed) how can we ever 
trust a claim to infal.libili ty again? 115 
6 Next Pepper considers claims of certainty. He subdivides appeals 
to certainty according to content: claims for the certainty of self-
evident principles, and appeals to the certainty of indubitable fact. 
Pepper doubts claims for the certainty of self, .. evident principles for 
reasons similar to those he gave for doubting the reliability of claims 
of infallibility. Foremost among these is the observation that there 
have been cases wherein one supposedly certain self-evident princ.iple 
5 WH, p. 21. 
6 WH, p. 21. 
19 
contradicted another. In addition to those objections, Pepper questions 
the very idea of some statement being evidence for itself . 
. How could anything be evidence for itself? The evidence 
for a fact is other facts bearing in upon it, causally or 
otherwise .... 'self evidence' is a way at once of acquiring 
the prestige of the criteria of evidence, and of dispensing 
with the need of applying them.7 · 
As before, the knowledge of the collapse of dozens of self-
evident principles held as certain in the past is enough to discredit 
the reliability of such a claim. Even the indispensable "Laws of 
ti Thought, often held to be certainly true through self-evidence, are 
dismissed as a successful application of the criterion of self-evidence. 
For example, Pepper regards the principle of contradiction as true. 
His judgement, however, is based on what he regards as empirical and 
hypothetical grounds, not on any criterion of self-evidence. 8 Finally, 
a claim for self-evidence collapses the instant it must be argued for, 
11If self-evidence must find evidence for itself elsewhere, it is no 
longer self-evidence. 119 
The certainty of indubitable facts has also crumbled often; again 
due to difficulties similar to those mentioned for infallible authority. 10 
7RTM ) p. 366. 
8 
Wh, p. 23. 
9wh, p. 24. 
lOWh, p. 25. v. Stephen C. Pepper, 11The Issue over the F.acts [ sub-
sequently abbreviated as· 11IOF 11 ], University of California Studies in 
Philosophy, XXV (1950), pp. 121-139. On p. 122 he gives some arguments 
against indubitables which are somewhat different from those given in 
WH: 11 ••• No reliable sign has yet been suggested for telling a pure 
fact from an impure one. 11 11 • • • The doctrine [ of indubi tables J- its elf 
is not indubitable. It has to be ar?iued for like any other nypothesis, 
which to say the least, is ironical. ' 11 • • .Historically quantities of 
cognitive material have been presented by men of the highest intelli-
gence as indubitable which subsequently have been accounted dubitable." 
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That there have been a number of instances wherein one supposedly in-
dubitable description is contradicted by another supposedly indubitable 
description of the .same fact is reason enough to suspect any claim that 
a de$cription of a fact is certainly c9rrect . 
. . . My whole point is that everybody makes mistakes, and 
therefore nobody 1 s claim of indubitability is utterly reli-
able. Such claims must always be checked up with corrob,o~ 
rative evidence. Consequently, nothing is indubitable, for 11 
we mean by indubitable a self-sufficient cognitive criterion. 
Despite all the negative criticism directed against dogmatic cer-
tainty and infallible authority, Pepper recognizes that some aspects of 
authority and certainty do have an appropriate place in methodology. 12 
The type of appeal to authority usually named "expert opinion" is ad-
missible if a claim for infallibility does not accompany the opinion, 
and if the opinion is openly obtained through an objective study of the 
relevant evidence . 
. We legitimately credit an authority, not because what-
ever he utters is true, but because he utters, we trust, 
only what he believes to be true .... Not because he is an 
ultimate source of knowledge; but because he is not .... 
We believe he is a reliable mediator and transmitter of know·-
ledge the ultimate validity of which likes elsewhere. 13 
The feeling of certainty can be a reliable guide to factuality, 
but the feeling is not the source of this reliability. 14 Things about 
wh:i,ch we feel certain often are true because that feeling becomes 
11wH, pp. 30-31. In IOF p. 121 one finds this statement which fur·-
ther amplifies his position against indubitables: "What I am main-
taining is that material offered.§.§. 1:.§.£.t in critical cognitive. inquiry 
cannot be accepted .§.§. exempt from cognitive criticism [{Pepper 1 s 
italics] . 11 
12WH 
J p. 37, 
13WH, p. 37. 
14 
37-38. WH, pp. 
21 
attached through habit to experiences that are consonant with our mental 
and physical constitution. Thence, things about which we feel certain 
are likely to be true if one is well adjusted to his environment. But· 
the feeling of certainty is not an ultimate criterion, and often it 
leads to error. It is the wiser course to subject judgements about 
which we feel certain to final justification by the evidence. 
Definitional Prescription. Pepper believes that there are three 
kinds of definitions--equational definitions, ostensive definitions and 
descriptive definitions. Each of these types are appropriate to differ-
ent kinds of situations in which meanings are wanted for terms. The 
descriptive definition is the only type which is "responsible to facts." 
It's proper use is in empirical inquiry. He doesn't mean to assert 
that nominal definitions can't be properly used in such inquiry. He 
does claim that excluding descriptive definitions from that kind of 
work is a mistake. 
For the facts are that in empirical inquiry observers desire 
expressions which ascribe meanings to symbols with the defi-
nite proviso that these meanings shall be as nearly true to 
fact as the available evidence makes possible.15 
His reason for believing this is that he has studied the way men 
who:areactually employed in "empirical inquiry" use definitions in some 
instances, Those observations have led him to the conclusion that some 
definitions are intended to have a truth reference, and indeed, they 
must have a truth reference because of the function they serve. Pepper 
states that many philosophers believe that no definition has a truth 
15stephen C. Pepper, 11The Descriptive Definition" [referred to 
hereinafter as 11DD 11 ], The Journal of Philosophy, XLIII (1946), p. 29. 
Definitional prescription is discussed only briefly in WH (pp. 32-36) 
which was first published in 1942. The fullest treatment of this point 
is in DD. 
22 
reference. In his opinion, using nominal definitions (his name for 
those lacking a truth reference) in cases wherein only descriptive def-
initions are appropriate constitutes employing methods which block in-
quiry, prevent criticism, and ignore evidence. 
There is a group of philosophers who have been making a 
determined effort to divorce a truth reference from all def-
initions. Their doctrine is that by definition a definition 
is nominal. Their argument is that this doctrine makes for 
clarity and ambiguity by drawing a sharp distinction between 
propositions that are expressions to which truth or falsity 
may be attributed, and definitions that are expressions which 
ascrib~ meanings to symbols and to which truth or falsity may 
not be ascribed. Simple as this sounds, the doctrine is a 
falsification of facts regarding certain expressions of the 
second sort, and in practice turns out to be a weapon to 
restrain criticism of crucial assumptions nominally defined, 
and even estops factual investigation and presentation of 
evidence questioning assumptions nominally defined. The 
doctrine, consequently, makes not for clarity in empirical 
inquiry, but for confusion and dogmatism.16 
What Pepper is claiming here is that the exclusive use of nominal def-
initions in what he calls "empirical inquiry" constitutes developing 
unacceptable grounds for belief because nominal definitions are in-
• t f • t f II • • 1 • • II appropria e or use in many par s o empiri.ca inquiry, Since the 
proponent of the exclusive U$e of nominal definitions uses unacceptable 
grounds in empirical inquiry, in those instances where only a descrip-
tive definition is appropriate, he is being dogmatic; he is placing too 
much confidence in his definitional methods. Since Pepper believes that 
there are just two kinds of nominal defin~tion, equational and osten-
sive, it is appropriate at this point to consider his description of 
them. 
16nn, p. 29. For a concrete case-study of how Pepper believes 
this "weapon" is dogmatically employed see Stephen C. Pepper, "A Criti-
cism of a Positivistic Theory of Mind, 11 University of California Publi-
cations in Philosophy, x;i:x (1936), pp. 211-232, Pages 216-227 are par-
ticularly'""appropriate to this point. 
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The equational definitionl7 involves the determination that some 
symbol (S) may be substituted for a more complex symbol (MN) wherever 
the latter occurs. The technique is merely one of convenience; saving 
the need to write out MN in every instance of its use. Equational def-
initions obviously contain no reference to fact. The symbols MN may be 
mere marks on paper or) more commonly) they are assumed to have in their 
own right a meaning which is itself defined in some way either by an-
other equational definition) or by some other definitional technique. 
Pepper states that the usual source for giving meaning to the 
symbols MN in an equational definition is an ostensive definition which 
. th d f h' · f · 1 d f' 't' 18 is e secon o is species o nomina e ini ion. In this method 
the symbol defined (S) is related to some empirical fact (0) through 
some sort of "relation of indication" or ostensive operation. With 
this techniq,ue one might define the symbol "chair" by uttering the word 
"chair") then pointing toward an object. In such a procedure the symbol 
S gets its meaning through the indicative operation which relates S to 
the observable object O. PeJ?per adds that there are many other indica-
tive operations besides pointing. For example) the symbol 11pain 11 could 
be defined ostensively if one jabbed his companion forcibly with a pin 
while uttering the symbol being defined. The companion would then have 
. 11 , 11 
an inti.mate knowledge of the meaning intended for pain. Pepper 
believes that there is no difference between an ostensive definition 
and what some writers have described as operational definitions. He 
attaches some importance to ostensive definitions because he thinks 
17DD) p. 30. 
18DD) pp. 30~31 
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that ultimately all facts of immediacy are indicated by operations of 
the ostensive type. 
A descriptive definition, 19 Pepper states, is a "Gestalt-like" 
triadic relation in which at the same instant a symbol is given a mean-
20 ing and the meaning is given a truth reference. It will be helpful to 
reproduce a diagram (see below, p. 25) Pepper used to describe this 
. 21 
relation. 
Here the symbol S such as 'water,' 'gravity,' 'neuron,' 
'reaction,' 'aversion, 1 1 purpose, 1 1 justice 1 is tentatively 
taken to indicate an empirical field O, and at the same time 
is tentatively equated with a description D which is pre-
sented as a true hypothesis of the characters, terms, and 22 
relations, or relational structure of the field indicated. 
Presumably, by "empirical field" Pepper means a series of observations 
or observation statements. 
The act of establishing a descriptive definition is found in the 
context of an empirical inquiry. 23 The intention is to attach a symbol 
unambiguously to a set of observed facts. In order to do that the sym-
bol is referred to the observations through a description which is as 
precise and true to the facts as it is possible to be. The descriptive 
definition will be inadequate if the description of the facts referred 
l9In reply to a possible charge that he is resurrecting the 
AristotE;)lian "real" definition in a new disguise, Pepper asserts that 
his account of the descriptive definition implies no reference to any 
Aristotelian essences or to any distinction between essential and 
accidental characteristics. v. DD, p. 34. 
20DD 29 J p. . 
21 . , 11 11 II II 11 11 DD, p. 31. The words describing S, 0, and D are not in 
the original diagram. 
22DD, p. 32. 
23DD, p. 32, 
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to by the symbol should prove vague or false. Should that condition 
occur, the symbol must be redefined by a more accurate description. It 
is not allowed in a descriptive definition to equate S with D, if D can 
be shown to be false. A rigid equation of S to D would be permitted 
only on the certainty (probably not attainable) that Dis completely 
true to O. The relation of S to Din a descriptive definition, hence, 
cannot be the relation of S to MN in an equational definition. Sis not 
arbitrarily equated with Din a descriptive definition. It is related 
to D only in so far as we know D to be a correct description of 0, 
... I should like it to be noticed that in empirical inquiry 
men· usuall;y do not intend that their terms shall mean simply 
other terms for convenience of expression. They intend their 
terms to mean veridical references to facts. When, for 
instance, a neurologist defines a neuron with certain des-
criptive terms, does he intend to equate the symbol 1 neuron 1 
with the symbols of his description? Quite clearly not. He 
believes his description is true to fact and that is why he 
tentatively equates the term 'neuron' with the description. 
That is what 'neuron· will mean for him during his exposition 
and until he can find a better definition of it as a closer 
descriptive approximation to the facts. 24 
One becomes dogmatic, Pepper asserts, whenever nominal definitions 
are used to block empirical inquiry. 
A nominal definition is by definition prescriptive .... If 
the right hand side of an equational definition is interpret-
able as an hypothesis with a truth reference to an empirical 
field, that hypothesis is frozen by the definition. A 
questioning of the hypothesis can then be plausibly estopped 
by declaring that a nominal definition is not susceptible to 
factual criticism.25 
He lists several consequences of blockage through using equational 
26 
_ definitions. . (1) Rather than seeking the facts, then adjusting an 
. 24DD 
' 
p. 33. Pepper's italics. 
25DD, p. 35. 
26 
DD, p. 35. 
27 
hypothesis to fit them, the inquirer might try to adjust the facts to 
an hypothesis already implicitly accepted in a rigid equational defi-
nition. ~) The inquirer may reject without investigation alternative 
hypotheses about the field of inquiry simply because they do not con-
form to his equational definition or because their use of terms is not 
his. 8) One might tend to minimize the differences in alternative 
descriptions of a common field by asserting that the differences are 
merely matters of language. (4) The researcher who is using only nomi-
nal definitions 
... is led to believe that since nominal definitions are arbi-
trary, and simply motivated by interest in giving a symbol 
a meaning, therefore the determinations of fields of em-
pirical enquiry are indications only of the enquirer's 
interests and in no way guided by structural lines in nature. 
Thus the doctrine of the nominal definition subtly prescribes 
ontological categories about the nature of facts and man's 
relations to them.27 
(5) Whenever an equational definition is questioneq by a critic, the 
defense is to invoke the logical purity of such a method, This shifts 
the issue from the significant one concerning the facts of the case to 
an issue about method, 
The ostensive species of nominal definitions is equally open to 
dogmatic abuse. 28 A dogmatist might employ it to attach a final meaning 
to a term such that the meaning is no longer amendable in the presence 
of new evidence. Used in that manner, it is prescriptive of empirical 
fact. Because of this, Pepper believes that the nominal ostensive 
27DD, p. 35. In pointing out the arbitrariness of nominal defi-
nitions of either type) Pepper appears to allude to the function per-
formed by what many writers call stipulati ve defi.ni tions, which Pepper 
apparently would claim is only a functional aspect of all nominal defi,-, 
nitions. 
28DD 6 ' p. 3 . 
definition is not particularly appropriate to empirical inquiry in 
which ostensive references must be tentative and subject to the control 
of a description with.a truth reference to the observational field. 
To sum up Pepper's objection to nominal definitions one might say 
that their employment as a prescription or an injunction to a body of 
evidence or a.field of inquiry is dogmatic and becomes an obstacle to 
gaining knowledge, "It 1· s noth1· ng to possess a clear defi" n1· ti· on 1· f 
' 
the definition distorts the facts, selects from the relevant facts, 
1129 shows only one aspect of the facts. Of course, the use of techniques 
of nominal definition does pot brand one as a dogmatist. However, 
Pepper thinks that their employment as injunctions to empirical inquiry 
surely does. 
Many recent writers on logic agree with Pepper that there are more 
types of definitions than only the two nominal species he mentioned. 
One other kind which seems to be similar to his "descriptive definition" 
is that which contemporary writers usually discuss under the heading 
"theoretical definitions." Here are some typical excerpts, 
Theoretical definitions do more than simply explain the 
meaning of a word; they also report on certain matters of 
theory, drawn either from science or from everyday· life. . . . 
The definition of 'grammar' as 'the science which seeks to 
codify the rules of language'does more than to tell us what 
'grammar' means; it rests upon a theoretical fact or suppo-
sition--that fixed rules govern the languages known to 
man .... A theoretical definition is one that rests upon 
some underlying item of theory whose rejection or disproof 
would render the definitions senseless or inappropriate. 
For example, a technical definition of 'Venus' as 'the 
planet that is carried by the third sphere from the earth' 
was rendered basically meaningless when the Copernican 
29 6 DD, p. 3 . 
system of astronomy replaced the Ptolemaic view of the uni-
verse.30 
.. ,a theoretical definition of a term is one which attempts 
to for,nulate a theoretically adequate characterization of the 
objects to which it is applied. To propose a theoretical defi-
nition is tantamount to proposing the acceptance of a theory, 1 
and, as the name implie~, theories are notoriously debatable.3 
Now this may only be speculation, but when all the details of 
29 
Pepper's descriptive definition are set aside and the general thrust of 
that concept is viewed, descriptive definitions and theoretical defi-
nitions look to be no different. They both involve characterizing a 
symbol or word (neither are attempts to directly characterize things)in 
terms of a theory or presupposition about the nature of things. If the 
last two sentences are correct, then Pepper is vindicated in objecting 
to the position that all defin:Ltions are either equational or ostensive. 
He may or may not be correct in saying that descriptive definitions have 
a truth reference, depending on the status of one other aspect of 
descriptive and theoretical definitions. 
Pepper has stated that there can be no description in the absence 
of a theory; or, expressed in another manner, being able to describe 
things presupposes a theory about the nature of things. This implies 
that a more accurate way of characterizing descriptive definitions (or 
theoretical definitions) would be to say that they have a theory refer-
ence instead of saying they have a truth reference. If theories can be 
said to be true or false, these definitions will then have a truth ref-. 
erence also; if not,.then there is only a theory referenceo Note that 
30Nicholas Rescher, Introduction to Logic (New York, 1964), PPo 32-
33. cf. James D. Carney and Richard K. Scheer, Fundamentals of Logic 
(New York, 1964), pp. 101-102. 
31copi, Irving M., Introduction to Logic (New York, 1961) op. 105. 
30 
Pepper's types of nominal definitions have no theory reference, Pepper 
is vindicated if he is objecting to the view which claims that no type 
of definition involves a theory reference. 
Consequences of the Rejection of Dogmatism 
Pepper thinks that his investigation of dogmatism implies that no 
dogmatic method is legitimate in any search for knowledge. The conse-
quence of rejecting dogmatic methods is "to wipe the slate of cognitive 
1132 
methods amazingly clean. · Pepper.believes that among the methodologi-
cal rejects are: deduction of truths from self-evident axioms; induc-
tive generalizations from indubitable or stubborn facts; the mystic 1 s 
method of labeling as unreal all except a specific sort of feeling; and 
the positivistic method of calling meaningless all which lies outside of 
an arbitrary definition of definition and meaning. These are all 
methods of refusing to let evidence be the guide for judgement.33 
Dogmatic criteria of knowledge in Pepper's opinion, are not only 
illegitimate, they are useless as means for making progress in the 
34 
search for knowledge. They add nothing to the grounds or content to 
which they are applied. But he says one would be mistaken in thinking 
that good results have not been obtained by persons employing dogmatic 
35 
methods. Cognitive success has often been gained in spite of their 
employment. Historical cases can be cited as evidence that they are 
32RTM, p. 366. 
33 RTM, p. 366. There are more rejected methods listed in this 
article than are cited in the text above. 
34WH, p. 38. 
35 RTM, p. 366-367. 
\ 
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unnecessary. For instance, the world view known as mysticism is fre-
quently supported on the grounds of indubitable immediacy. There is no 
difference .in the mystic I s description of the nature of things whether 
it is offered as a certainty or an hypothesis. If the description is 
true, the mystic's intuition of the nature of things is upheld; if false; 
the intuition is illusory. Thus Pepper claims, there is no cognitive 
gain in dogmatically insisting on the intuition by appealing to aver-
sion of the criterion of indubitable facts. 
Dogmatism is, therefore, unnecessary. In fact, dogmatism has 
always in the history of thought been obstructive to cognitive 
advance, and the cognitive drive has come from a method of 
hypothesis. It is this method working beneath the dogmatisms 
of the great thinkers th~t has produced the advances in 
philosophy and science.3 
Difficulties in Pepper's Views About Dogmatism 
If Pepper considers his characterization of dogmatism (see above, 
p. 13) as a definition of dogmatism, one could object to it on the 
grounds that it is a persuasive definition. 
A 1 persuasive 1 definition is one which gives a new conceptual 
meaning to a familiar word without substantially changing its 
emotive meaning, and which is used with the conscious or un-
conscious purpose of changing, by this means, the direction of 
people's interests.37 
Here is a dictionary definition of dogmatism: "Positiveness in 
assertion in matters of opinion; statement of a view or belief as if it 
were an established fact; derogatorily, such positiveness or statement 
. 
36RTM, p. 367. cf. MM, p. 261 
37 Charles Leslie Stevenson "Persuasive Definitions, 11 Mind, XLVII 
(1938) , p. 331. This concept (Persuasive Definition) was originated 
by Stevenson. It is used here for criticism of Pepper's views. 
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when unwarranted or arrogant."38 Pepper revised the conceptual meaning 
It • It ( of dogmatism seemingly without considering the emotive meaning e.g. 
the underlined phrases above) which remained untouched. The result of 
such a procedure is to enjoin implicitly persons whose positions fit the 
stipulated conceptual redefinition of dogmatism. The new definition 
thus has the effect of redirecting people's admiration. Whether Pepper 
actually intended to use the residual emotive meaning to sway interests 
is not known. Of course, Pepper is free to stipulate the conceptual 
meaning of a word as he sees fit, although one would expect more care 
in dealing with the emotive element. 
The central part of the definition of dogmatism is the notion of 
attitude. It has been suggested that this is fairly described as one 1 s 
state of mind in reference to the degree of confidence in the truth of 
a content. Previous criticism (see above, p. 1~, ff.) has displayed the 
lack of a criterion for judging whether one's degree of confidence is 
in proper proportion to the known grounds (call this criterion I); 
neither is there a means provided for determining one 1 s degree of con-
fidence in a content (call this criterion II) . This implies rejecting 
as either unworkable or unsupported that portion of the definition of 
dogmatism which reads: "a dogmatist is one whose attitude is not in 
proportion to the grounds of belief--one who believes, or disbelieves, 
or unbelieves too much in terms of the grounds of belief. 11 The collapse 
of this aspect of the definition leaves two more facets which still may 
be workable. 
Does anyone who resists the search for new grounds deserve the name 
3811Dogmatism, 11 Webster's New International Dictionary of the Eng-
lish Language (2nd ed., Springfield, 1960), p. 765, emphasis mine. 
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"dogmatist?" An affirmative answer involves being able to show that 
proposed evidential items are indeed grounds for a particular content. 
A criterion for doing that has not been provided by Pepper (call this 
criterion III). The same deficiency (III) applies to the third char-
acteristic of dogmatism: when presented with new grounds the dogmatist 
refuses to change his attitude accordingly. This third aspect of the 
definition also assumes having a criterion(I) for judging if one's 
attitude is appropriate to the grounds. 
Thus far, application of the three parts of Pepper's definition of 
dogmatism has been prevented because of the lack of several criteria 
(I, II, III) . Probably these criteria could not be found short of a 
metaphysical theory which, at this point, .Pepper denies having. He is 
trying to be metaphysically neutral and describe the cognitive situation 
as it actually is in regard to dogmatism. No part of his conceptual 
redefinition of dogmatism succeeded because he failed to provide the 
criteria needed for its application. 
That is unfortunate because the force of his persuasive defi.ni.tion 
of dogmatism must get its energy only from the emotive side. In a 
paper published in 1932, Pepper pointed out that 
... there is no means by which we can assure ourselves by 
merely looking at data or principle8 that they are not dis-
torted by dubious subterranean hypotheses. And it seems to 
follow that the only rational way of discovering the nature 
of things is to spread out openly at the beginning the hypo-
theses which give things the nature we seem to perceive in 
them.39 
This statement applies to Pepper's discussion of dogmatism. All he has 
accomplished is giving what amounts to a persuasive definition of 
39 8 MSF, pp. 7- . 
dogmatism, the conceptual portion of which is unworkable. Therefore., 
h h th d 11d t. t " . t 1 ff t . . f w enever e uses e wor ogma is , is on ye ec is expression o 
disapproval. 
Probably there are not any intrinsically dogmatic methods--there 
are only dogmatic men. Any method, including either scientific or hypo-
thetical methods, can be appropri.ated for a dogmatic person's purpose. 
A dogmatist is a man who promises himself "I will never change my opin,-
ion, about this." " ·" " ·" Dogmatic and fanatic are very close in meaning. 
It would then be better to speak not of a method as dogmatic, but to say 
it is being used dogmatically. 
Pepper has rejected belief in indubitables and certainties on the 
grounds that men have often given different indubitable descriptions of 
the same fact, or held conflicting certainties. These conflicting posi-
tions could be held non-dogmatically in spite of the conflicts if each 
person believes that to the best of his abili. ty he has examined. all 
possible evidence or suggestions for evidence. The conflict does mean 
that one of the proponents is wrong-·-i t doesn't mean they are dogma-
tists. 
Pepper can't afford to reject every theory which bears the mark of 
indubitability. As we shall soon see in the next section on skepticism, 
he believes that one can't rationally doubt what he has called "middle·-
" sized facts, or dubitanda. He thinks they are the bottom ground beyond 
which skepticism cannot advance. Since they aren't rationally dubitable 
as a whole, they must be in some way indubitable, 
Pepper has given a fairly convincing argument by simple enumeration 
that amounts to pointing out many historical examples of the failure of 
certainties, infallibilities and indubitables. This argument is good 
35 
reason for questioning anyone who claims to know something certainly or 
infallibly, or indubitably. However, this argument provides no grounds 
for naming as dogmatists persons who believe in certainties. Simply 
adopting a certainty is not a sufficient condition for being a dogma-
tist. 
Skepticism 
Professor Pepper believes that his study of dogmatism has shown 
that there are no ways for humans to ensure themselves of certainty. 
His examination of skepticism is an attempt to show to what degree one 
is justified in doubting. The study of dogmatism implies that some sort 
of doubt is healthy. The study of skepticism might be described as an 
attempt to pl.ace limits on doubt. His investigative approach in this 
case is to enumerate all the possible interpretations of utter skepti-
cism, then examine each one. He begins by accepting that generally, an 
11 1140 
utter skeptic is he who doubts all things. Professor Pepper, one 
should note, gives his own meaning to "doubt." One genuinely doubts 
whenever 11he finds the evidence on both sides so evenly balanced.. . 
that he neither believes nor disbelieves, but holds the proposition in 
1141. 
suspense. He hints again at this matter when he leaves the imp:res~ 
sion that doubt is a "sense of balance of evidence, 1142 
Pepper's first interpretation of the position of the utter skeptic 
40 WH, p. 4. Much of QI concerns the question of the limits of 
skepticism. However, the account given in WH is as complete and. is 
somewhat better organized, so the WH treatment is summarized here. 
41 WH, pp. 4-5. 
42 WH,.p. 6. 
is that possibly the skeptic, in stating that he doubts all things, is 
43 
asserting that all facts are illusory and all statements false. 
According to Pepper's terminology, this is clearly not a position of 
doubt, but one of complete and certain disbelief in the reliability of 
all evidence and in the truth of all statements. It would be equivalent 
to state that this position is a belief in the unreliability of all evi-
dence and the falsity of all statements. 11For every instance of dis-
belief is simply the reverse of belief; it is belief in the contra-
dictory of what is disbelieved. 1144 Because this position amounts to 
holding an attitude of complete certainty of disbelief, it amounts to 
dogmatism; thus it is rejected. 
This suggests the possibility that the utter skeptic in his doubt 
of all things is one who never believes nor disbelieves anything, but 
holds all propositions in suspense. 45 Pepper points out that this 
attitude of suspense of judgement is quite a common occurrence in cases 
involving balanced evidence pro and con, or in cases wherein evidence is 
lacking. But, generalizing from these isolated instances to state that 
an attitude of unoelief is appropriate for all things is a step un-
supported by ev;Ldence, The presence of dubitanda in their.varying 
degrees of reliabil;Lty points toward the contrary. There are many cases 
of imbalal').ce involving stronger evi.dence in support (or rejection) of a 
proposition. One does not find that all things are in a balance of evi-
dence. For example one does not doubt that he sees blue when he 
43WH, p. 4. 
44WH, p. 4. 
45 5. WH, p. 
observes a blue sky. The balance of evidence in favor of one seeing 
blue in that instance is very great as against slight negative possi-
bilities. Furthermore, Pepper believes that one cannot consistently 
hold the position in question while continuing to act. "A consistent 
utter skeptic of the kind here supposed exhibits his beliefs and dis-
beliefs and denies his balanced doubts every time he takes a step or 
says a word. To avoid self-contradiction, he should never speak nor 
t 1146 ac . 
But suppose the utter skeptic is not referring to practical be-
liefs, but to the grounds for ultimate beliefs. That is, he might be 
claiming that if one pursues rational study out to its end, one finds 
that the evidence is evenly balanced for all sides of any question.47 
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According to Pepper, this is a theory of the nature of things which the 
skeptic may assert as a certainty. This would be dogmatic and unaccept-
able. If not that, the skeptic may regard his position as a theory 
about the nature of things, while trying to support it with evidence. 
As a theory, this form of skepticism exhibits several shortcomings. 
And a most peculiar nature on this view all things must have. 
For take any statement: on this view the evidence for that 
statement must be evenly balanced; but so also must be the 
evidence for the evidence for the statement; and so on ad 
infinitum, For if there were ever any evidence for a state-
ment that was not itself divided into two equally balanced 
parts of pro and .££n, there would be more evidence for some-
thing in the universe than against it, which would refute 
this position of the utter skeptic .... The utter skeptic .. 
in presenting any sort of positive theory is always placed in 
an embarrassing position. For whatever that theory may be, 
46W1:I, P. 6 . 
47W1:I, p. 6 . 
it must, on his own assumptions, be utterly doubted .... Hi~8 
only safety lies in silence, and then nobody listens to him. 
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Finally, the utter skeptic might be one who doubts on principle the 
value of any kind of knowledge. Perhaps he is one who "turns to faith 
or action or emotion and sets his back against knowledge. Perhaps he 
finds the structure, or form, or method of knowledge itself decep-
tive.1149 Yet, one who completely disbelieves the products of knowledge 
is committed to believing in the deceptive structure of all knowledge. 
One must completely believe the latter, with certainty, or else some 
products of knowledge will be more credible than others. Through com-
mitting himself to a certainty, the utter skeptic becomes a dogmatist. 
Pepper considers the "method of doubt" as one other possible inter-
pretation of skepticism.50 Its most famous exponent was Descartes. 
Pepper rejects the technique as a philosophical method on the grounds 
that it is only an expository device. It consists in trying to doubt 
everything in order to clear the area of discussion of its old doctrine 
so that, hopefuXly, one may begin anew. 
To summarize Pepper 1 s analysis of utter skepticism_, he states that 
every interpretation of the general position leads either into dogmatism 
or into partial skepticism.51 The latter is Pepper 1 s term for one who 
suspends judgement in the presence of a balance (or lack) or evidence, 
but who believes (or disbelieves) in many things in varying degrees 
based upon the related evidence. Pepper believes that an utter skeptic 
48W1!, p. 7, 
49W1!, p. 8. 
50W1!, p. 8. 
51 9. 'WH, p. 
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must be an utter believer, or an utter disbeliever, or an utter un-
believer. He is obviously not the first, nor could he be the second 
since that is merely the first in its negative form. The skeptic is 
left with only unbelief as a haven. If he is a partial unbeliever, 
Pepper accepts his position as a legitimate possibility. But an utter 
unbeliever 
.. ,sets demands upon the nature of fact and judgement and 
indeed of the whole universe which must be believed to guar-
antee the possibility of utter unbelief. . . . The position 
of the utter skeptic is, we find on careful scrutiny, impos-
sible. It amounts to the self contradictory dogma that the 
world is certainly doubtful. If this thesis is taken seri-
ously, it is not a skeptical position, but a dogmatic one.52 
A man who makes a sweeping denial of knowledge does not appear to 
be accepting cognitive responsibility.53 Yet, he is accepting as much 
cognitive responsibility as if he had claimed to know all thingso The 
complete denial must be supported by evidence just as the positive claim 
must. The best attitude is to follow the evidence wherever it will lead. 
"Skepticism in excess of the evidence, or without any evidence, is not 
canniness in knowledge, but is dogmatic."54 
Pepper concludes that "utter skeptic" is just a disagreeable name 
whi.ch we are likely to give someone who persists in doubting a belief 
which we prize for which we can't find adequate cognitive support. If 
the utter skeptic is not a dogmatist in reverse, he probably means to be 
a partial skeptic. In reality, Pepper states, the utter skeptic is a 
straw man. His examination of all the possible types of utter 
52WH, p. 9. 
53stephen C. Pepper, The Basis of Criticism in ~ Arts (Cambridge, 
1963), p. 4. This book is henceforth cited as BCA. 
54 BC.A, p. 4. 
skepticism leads him to assert that it is an empty name . 
. . . [The utter skeptic] is a good deal of a :nzy-th. Nothing is 
more common than to find men holding in imagination and with 
conviction what turn out to be logically or physically impos-
sible beliefs. There may be men who honestly regard themselves 
as utter skeptics, but if there really are such they are hard 
to find.55 
55 WH, pp. 9-10. 
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CHAPTER III 
CORROBORATION AND HYPOTHESES 
Having examined both dogmatism and utter skepticism, Dr. Pepper 
believes that he has shown reasons for their unacceptability. He thinks 
that this result plus his doctrine of common-sense facts enables him to 
resolve an important dilemma. 
. . .Either there are indubitable facts and we are able to ob-
serve them, or there is nothing left but utter skepticism. 
From between the horns of this dilemma I creep out by suggest-
ing that there are middle..Jsized facts which are not indubi-
table) nor pure, nor very stubborn, but which none the less 
are not nothing and have enough resistance to demand attention. 
They have quite enough resistance to make every presumptuous 
theory .look a little foolish sometimes .... That is the reason, 
when the latest theory has fallen and the newest indubitable 
has turned out to be dubitable, that the un~verse does not go 
completely out of existence as it ought. The world simply 
sinks back, as it always does, on the bosom of middle-sized 
fact .1 . 
Thus, Professor Pepper thinks that there is left nothing but common-
sense facts (or uncriticized evidence) upon which to base knowledge. 
Criticized evidence or postanalytical knowledge arises from a process of 
refinement of dubitanda. 2 The implements of refinement are the method 
of multiplicative corroboration and the method of structural corrobora-
tion. It is through these two techniques that men criticize, interpret., 
analyze, c;:orrelate dubitanda so that the result is postanalytical 
1MSF, pp. 12-13. cf. WH, pp. 2-3. 
2 IOF, pp. 124~125. 
1+1 
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knowledge. Because there are two types of corroboration, Pepper be-
lieves there are two types of criticized evidence.3 The products of 
" " multiplicative corrol)oration he calls data ; those of structural cor-
roboration are called "danda". One does not find a sudden leap from 
uncriticized to criticized evidence. There are degrees of corroboration 
of both kinds which are less refined than the most criticized forms of 
knowledge, yet which are more refined than dubitanda .. For these kinds 
• " Tl Tl " of evidence Pepper uses the terms rough data and rough danda . 
Multiplicative Corroboration 
Multiplicative corroboration 
... comes from taking an observation repeatedly (or as often 
as we think necessary) till we are quite sure there has been 
no error. It is the corroboration of one observation with 
another, or of one man with another, where the fact observed 
is supposed to.be exactly identical in the different obser~ 
vations. It is that identical fact that is said4to be cor-
roborated.· It is a corroboration of man by man. 
A datum reaches its highest refinement if it is as free. as possible 
from interpretation; that is, when it is refined to the point where ob-
server interpretation is no longer a factor. "Absolutely ideal data 
are probably not available, but close.approximations to them have been 
[-
developed in the course of cognitive history.") Two species of refined 
data are distinguished: empirical data ellld .logical clat.s. 
l-,'i_ 
Empiirical data in their most refined form consist of pointer 
readings and correlations between pointer readings. These are the 
3 WH, pp. 48-50. 
4 BCA, p. 6. cf. WH, p. 49; IOF, p. 125. 
5WH, p. 52. 
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physical scientist's ideal data.6 Pointer readings offer cognitive 
security because, primarily, they are as far removed as possible from 
the observer's bodily processes. Second, the fact that they can be read 
by the eye, one of our most discriminating senses, is important. The 
eye can also be aided by levers, lenses, etc. which increase its capa-
bility, A correlation occurs when several men, or one man, having 
reduced a dubitandum to a pointer reading, discovers a continuing sta~ 
bility of readings, or that two or more readings repeatedly occur in 
some precisely statable re].ation. The aim is to achieve cognitive items 
so clear, distinct, and simple that disagreement about them is nearly 
impossible. Types of empirical data other than the scientist's pointer 
readings (and correlations between them) are on less solid foundations. 
Indeed, the empirical data handled in the various disciplines usually 
II • 11 labelled SClences range from near-dubitanda to rough data to well-
refined.pointer readings. Pepper believes that the more a discipline 
is concerned with pointer readings or with facts approaching pointer 
readings (e.g. statistical enumerations), the more objective and 
scientific it will be. 
Logical data which comprise the second kind of refined data are 
,· ,. • . . the evidence for the validity of logical and mathern.atical 
transitions and for those organizations of such transitions 
which are called logical and mathematical systems .... The 
aim is to obtain types of transition so simple and obvious 
that any and all men observing them will agree that they. are 
legitimate.? 
Logical data develop out of conunon sense to reach their most refined 
state in symbolic logic. Pepper follows the analysis given in 
6
~r, pp. 134-135 and WR, pp. 52-53. 
7ym, pp. 57;..58, 
. ·~ ' : . ' ) 
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Lewis and Langford, Symbolic Logic (New York, 1932), pp. 125-126, in 
that he claims that Lewis has named the principal kinds of logical data 
as substitution, inference (affirming the antecedent), and adjunction 
~onjunction). Professor Pepper thinks that any man with ordinary 
intellectual capacity would admit in a logical proof the obviousness of 
the steps of substitution, adjunction, and inference once the postulates 
and rules of substitution of the particular system were understood. 
Thus, he claims that the cognitive strength of logical proof is based on 
multiplicative corroboration in the form of logical data. 8 
Structural Corroboration and Hypotheses 
Structural Corroboration 
.· ... is not a multiplicity of observations of one identical 
·fact, but an observed convergence of many different facts 
towards one result. We have a crude use of it in what we 
call circumstantial evidence, where a variety of different 
circumstances all point to a single conclusion. Repetitions 
of observations are frequently impossible. Wherever a ques-
tion arises over a past historical event, for instance, the 
observation of that event can never be repeated and corrobo-
ration has to be made in terms of a convergence of evidence 
in terms of other facts than the one in question towards the 
probability of the nature of that event. Such corroboration 
requires a hypothesis to indicate the way in which the evi-
dence may converge to corroborate a fact. The hypothesis 
holds all the corroborating facts together in a system and, 
in so far as the hypothesis is verified, the whole system 
of facts gains in probability.· That is, every new fact that 
is added to the system of evidence and fits in with the hypo-· 
thesis tends to corroborate not only the central fact at 
issue but also all the other facts in the system in their 
relationship to the hypothesis.9 
The study of structural corroboration and danda involves the study 
8 
WH, pp. 58-59, 
9BCA, p. 7. &,;f. WH, p. 49; IOF, pp. 125-126. In WH, p. 70. one 
Jfinds this additional relate'd· CQ~ent: -- 11Dand;-are the fa'cts· that see:in: 
it:.'o be gLve,ri: as.;wecnote.1tihe: e:ictgnded corroboration· of fact··by fact ... 
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of hypotheses. Pepper acknowledges that there are as many views about 
10 hy~otheses as there are views about knowledge, He points out two 
positions other than his own: . the common sense view wherein a hypothe-
sis ;is equated with a guess; the conventionalist view that hypotheses 
· are only human conventions for keeping. data in order. A good name for 
Pepper's opinion of the nature of hypotheses would be the "structural 
view, 11 He believes that other detailed views o:f the nature of hypothe-
ses arise from the results of structural corroboration; there are as 
many of these detailed views as there are relatively adequate systems of 
unlimited structural corroboration. These systems are the various world 
hypotheses. 
Pepper thinks that entering into detail concerning the nature of 
hypotheses in terms of structural corroboration would amount to becoming 
involved in one of' the world theories. Pepper, therefore, ·confines him~ 
self at this point to general remarks on the nature of hypothese~ in 
terms of structural corroboration. He believes his remarks will thus 
avoid cons ti tu.ting an injunction to world theories., which would be 
inappropriate because the only legitimate sources of such injunctions 
are world theories which purport to inform us about the structure of the 
world. 
The cognitive value of structural hypotheses is generated directly 
ou,t of the mode of cognitive refinement which requires them. That mode 
[they] are facts that ought to be given if the hypothesis whicb 
describes an extended mass of structural corroboration were true 
[italics are Pepper's]." Pepper uses the words 11hypothesis 11 and "theory" 
interchangably as if they were equivalent in meaning. 
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is structural corroboration,11 And structural corroboration cannot get 
along except by the aid of theories which provide the hypothetical 
connections that bring evidence together. The r.eliabili ty of a struc-
tural hypothesis can be increased by either developing the accuracy or 
II • • II f th h th • b t d' th f f t h" h precision o e ypo esis, or y ex en ing e range o ac s w ic 
it takes into it (Pepper's term for this is "scope"). Pre·cision and 
scope are closely related. Increasing the precision inevitably leads to 
the accumulation of more evidence. Broadening the scope will lead to a 
more precise analysis of the evidence. 
The ideal structural hypothesis is one of unlimited scope, one 
which all facts will corroborate. 12 Such is the nature of world hypo-
theses. They are the result of the search for reliability in confirming 
structural theories. So long as there are facts which have not been 
presented.to the theory--facts which possibly will not corroborate facts 
already organized by the theory--the theory's reliability will be in 
question. The drive for reliability through more and more structural 
corroboration thus leads to the concept of an unlimited world hypothe-
sis. 
Not every structural hypothesis is unlimited as world hypotheses 
are. l3 Pepper thinks that it often proves useful. in prac.tice for spe-· 
cialists to draw an arbitrary line in nature, then stipulate that only 
the evidence within the guide line is relevant to the problem being 
studied, but the facts outside it are not. One employing this technique 
11WH, pp. 75-76. 
12W,HJ p. 77. 
l3WH, pp. 77-78, 
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must realize that in. terms of structural corroboration the hypotheses 
covering such facts are tentative, provisional and limited. They could 
only be otherwise if there were no disturbing facts bearing on them out-
side the arbitrary field, Whether there are such upsetting facts cannot 
be known unless one explores to see. Such an exploration through struc-
tural corroboration would lead into a world hypothesis of unlimited 
scope, 
Wo:rld hypotheses draw data into their scope as well as danda. In 
that manner they acquire· the cognitive strength of multiplicative cor-
roboration.14 However~ data are not necessarily cognitively self-
justified. Cognition needs both kinds of refined evidence although 
Pepper is convinced that within the d.omain of structural corroboration 
danda must come fir~t; data must submit to structural corroboration. 
Pepper believes that there is a tension between the two types of 
criticized evidence which is similar to that between critical evidence 
in general, and common-sense evidence. 15 A typical response to corrobor-
oration is to assert that data have priority over danda. The more re-
fined. a datum becomes, the less the chance of it giving away to a dan-
dum, simply because tne refined datum contains very little by way of 
assertion. But rough data constantly give way to established hypothe-
ses. Pepper's example is that ghosts are often observed by earnest 
persons. Yet, ghosts are doubted by scientists and philosophers because 
the existence of ghosts doesn't fit into well-established physical 
theories; they are expl1,dned away as highly interpreted perceptions. 
14wH, p. 78-79, 
15WH, pp. 50-51. 
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The greater the refinement of structural corroboration) the less 
distinct are the contrasts between hypothesis and evidence. 
In a world theory it is impossible to say where pure fact ends 
and interpretation of fact begins. Within the theory itself 
the distinction is clear. The theory will tell you what in 
fact is fact and what in fact is theory. But another6equally 
reliable theory will draw the line in another place. 1 
The aim of a world hypothesis is to make the structure of corroboration 
so natural; so lacking in arbitrary elements) that it constitutes the 
very structure of nature and is not hypothetical at all. One fact will 
corroborate another fact only if the structural bearing of the one on 
the other is itself a fact. 
The aim is to make the very structure of the corroboration, so 
to speak; natural or causal; and to remove all arbi.trary ele-
ments (except the bare symbols of verbal expression) from the 
hypothesis. So far as this aim is achieved; the hypothesis 
constitutes the very structure of nature and is not hypotheti-
cal or a hypothesis at all. 17 
Pepper realizes that this ideal of his structural view of hypotheses is 
not attained, as shown by the conflict of world hypotheses with each 
other, and by their internal deficiencies. But we.do get some idea of 
the world from these theories. Without them we would be mostly in the 
dark. 
Highly refined .danda of the best world hypotheses have often been 
adopted by philosophers as indubitable and certain. Pepper believes.1 
however, th~t well-refined danda are highly probable) but less than 
certain and indutitable. 18 None of the competi.ng systems of structural 
corroboration can support a claim to absolute truth. Pepper regards 
16 WH, p. 79. 
17WH, p. 80. 
18 
pp. 80-81. WH, c.f. IOF, pp. 121-126. 
them as hypothetical. 
Preanalytical fact is vague and subject to correction, and can 
only claim indubitability if it can survive analysis .... 
Postanalytical data could well be indubitable ... yet the very 
circumstance that they emerge from analysis of preanalytical 
data.makes it hard to believe that they are literally indubi-
table. For only if the methods used in analyzing preanalytical 
data were themselves free from the possibility of error would· 
it appear safe to assume that the products of these methods 
were free f~om the possibility of error. 19 
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Pepper considers the question, in what way does a structural world 
theory differ from a scientific theory? 
If by 'scientific I is meant the methods which present-day sci-
ences employ and accept in practice, our answer must be: 
'There is no difference. At most there is only the difference 
of scope:, and:.even th?t ctoes not hold since scientists today 
as always have assisted in the-development of structural world 
theori.es and have often ardently believed in them. 1 20 
In other words, inthis context the only difference between scientific 
theories and world hypotheses is that the former are limited in scope 
and the latter are nbt, 
Pepper reframes the above question in a way that he thinks reveals 
the motive for asking it: How is a structural world theory different 
from a convention?listic hypothesis like that developed by the posi ti-
vists?21. His answer is that a conventionalistic theory is admittedly 
artificial and distinguished from the evidence it unites. The criteria 
for its value are economy of intellectual effort and elegance, or util-
. i ty and beauty. A developed structural world theory is not easily dis-
tinguishable from much of the evidence it organizes. It is, then, con-
ceived as a natural and inevitable reflection of the structure of the 
19roF, pp. 124-125. 
20WH, p. 82. cir. MM, p. 253; RTM,- pp. 368-369. 
2L_, WH pp. 82-83. 
50 
evidence it organizes; it is not conceived as something artificial. A 
structural world theory is conceived as if the references of its symbols 
passed directly out into the natural structures being symbolized. 
To state the contrast in brief: the data systematized by 
a conventionalistic hypothesis provide no evidence whatever 
for the cognitive value of the hypothesis, whereas the danda 
organized by a structural hypothesis do constitute evidence 
for the cognitive value of that hypothesi's. If truth means 
the possession of a cognitive value, then to say that a con-
ventionalistic hypothesis is true (or false) would be a self-
contradiction, whereas to say that a structural hypothesis is 
not true (or false) would be a self-contradiction. From this, 
it will probably be generally admitted that scientists make 
considerable use of structural hypotheses. Philosophers are 
not the only men in pursuit of the truth, nor scientists the 
only men collecting facts.22 
Since Pepper thinks that structural corroboration is legitimate 
cognitive criticism, one is naturally led to inquire about the source of 
its legitimacy. Pepper has little to say about this. He does make this 
statement which leaves the question hanging. "The corroborative proced-
ures [both structural and multiplicative] are themselves ... clearly 
exhibited as a part of the world's total fund of evidence. 1123 
Objections to Pepper's Characterization of World Hypotheses 
Pepper's opinion that breadth of scope is the only difference be-
tween scientific theories and structural world theories is a view that 
requires closer scrutiny. For if that is the only difference, a meta-
physician is then some kind of super-scientist. Presumably, under 
Pepper's approach the metaphysician's proper task is dealing with 
22 
WH, p. 83. 
23MM, p. 269. He goes on to make this enigmatic comment: 11 I am 
even tempted to suggest that these corroborative procedures constitute 
our best contemporary answer to the problem of inducti.on. 11 
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structural world hypotheses. Surely, Professor Pepper does not want to 
maintain that a.metaphysician, by virtue of being an expert on unlimited 
world theories, is the ultimate scientist; Probably, neither would he 
want to hold that the methods employed for evaluating scientific theo-
ries are the same as those used for evaluating metaphysical theories. 
But these consequences are implied if one asserts that scope is the only 
disparity between science and metaphysics. There must be more contrast 
between these two than simply theoretical scope. For one thing, Pepper 
has c.laimed that both scientific hypotheses and world hypotheses can 
rightly be said to be true or false. Whether this is correct for scien·-
tific theories need not be raised at this point. However, it is impor-
tant to reply to Pepper by giving some reasons why metaphysical theories 
(Pepper's world theories) are improperly described as being true or' 
false in the same sense as scientific theories are.true or false. 
The Logical Positivists against whom Pepper has reacted so strongly. 
hold that there are just two kinds of philosophically significant state-
ments. They hold that a statement is literally meaningful if and only 
if it is either analytic or empirically verifiable. This is the basis 
for the Positivist charge that most statements in metaphysical dis-
courses are either tautologies or they fit neither of the two possible 
categories of meaningful utterences. 
Recent writers on metaphysics have suggested that the Positivist 
24 list of the types of meaningful statements is not complete. These 
philosophers (e.g. Walsh, pp. 154-170) have proposed that there are, 
24v. Milton K. Munitz, The Mystery of Existence (New York, 1965), 
pp. 241-254; W. H. Walsh, Metaphysics (London, 1963), pp. 154-188; 
Frli.edrich Waismann, "How I See Philosophy," Contemporary British 
Philoso,:ph.y, ed. H. D~ Lewis (London, 1961) ~ · 
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indeed, three classes of meaningful statements: analytic (or formal) 
statements, empirical (or material) statements, and categorial (or meta-
physical) statements. The line of argument which this writer is offer-
ing is that Pepper has tried to place both metaphysical and scientific 
theories in the class of empirical statements. This mistake arose '!from 
his desire to defend metaphysics from the Positivist II II · nonsense charge. 
But fepper apparently fell into their trap by accepting the strictly 
dichotomous Positivist classification of significant propositions, then 
attempting to show that "world hypotheses". are empirical. The better 
approach is to revise the classification of significant propositions. 
When this is done, Pepper's world hypotheses appear as categorial 
schemes--system~tic arrangements of the third type of significant state-
ment. 
A categorial statement is a proposition which incorporates, or is 
licensed by, a categorial principle. "Philosophical problems can be 
tackled piecemeal" is an example of a categorial statement which is 
warranted by the categorial principle "Tackle philosophical problems in 
' 1 II a piecemea manner. 
Categorial principles are used as rules. They are supposed, not 
asserted. They function as fundamental presuppositions in terms of 
which one makes sense out of experience. Categorial principles are of 
a higher logical order than empirical or analytic statements. They pro-
vide a framework upon which knowledge is built. One great difference 
between metaphysics and science, then, is that science is an activity 
proceeding under a set of generally agreed upon rules or categorial 
principles, while metaphysicians are advocating, comparing, developing 
different sets of these rules. Thus, the question of true or false is 
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quite different between science and metaphysics. For example) some of 
the agreed upon categorial principles in science are what are known as 
11d ' , d II 1 b h' h th , t, , , t d t ec1s1on proce ures --rues y w 1c e scien 1f1c communi y e er-
mines whether to accept or reject a scientific theory. There is no 
simtlar case for metaphysics. In that discipline there is no generally 
accepted decision procedure for rejecting or accepting categorial 
syi;;tems (or world hypotheses, if you will) . There is no "objective" 
proof for a metaphysical theory because it is a system or scheme of 
categorial principles. The reason there is no mutually agreeable de-
cision procedure for metaphysics is that metaphysicians are involved in 
advocating just what the rules should be--not only rules for science) 
but rules which are the unquestioned, ultimate conceptual framework in 
terms of which one looks at the world, guides his inquiries, and inter-
prets his experience. 
ThusJ to condemn metaphysics viewed in these terms is absurd. "To 
· ,,25 
say that metaphysics is nonsense is nonsense. Metaphysics does not 
give informatton of a factual sort; it is not a science like physics is 
a science; it is neither primarily a deductive nor an inductive dis-
cipline. In it "there are no questions which can be decided, yes or 
,~6 . 
no. The metaphysi.cian does offer arguments to support a point of 
vtew, but not for the purpose of proving his position true or false. 
The metaphysician's task is to give a rational vision of the world, 
" ... To an outsider ... [the metaphysician] appears to advance all 
sorts of arguments, this is not the decisive point. What is decisive is 
25 · Waismann, p. 489; his italics. 
26Ibid., p. 447. 
that he has seen things from a new angle of vision."27 
If this discussion is correct, Pepper is wrong in claiming that 
scope provides the only diversity between scientific and metaphysical 
theories. There is so much difference that it is a bit unwise to con-
II II 11· II tinue to use hypothesis and theory in both areas without delineating 
what those words mean for each of the two disciplines. Except when sum-. 
marizing Pepper's position, it would be wise to speak of hypotheses and 
theories in reference to science. . II For metaphysics the phrase categor~ 
ial scheme" is better than "world theory" or "metaphysical hypothesis. ' 1 
Critique of Multiplicative Corroboration 
Empirical Data. In his separation of empirical data from danda 
Pepper may be making a distinction without very much difference. A re-
fined datum ach:Leves that state by a process of refinement, or better, 
by a hypothesis of refinement. This suggests that Pepper may have the 
cart before the horse. He seems to believe that empirical data can be 
found by simply looking for them. That this is not true is indicated by· 
the aphorism that. one finds what one is seeking. It would be more accu-
rate to say that a single empirical datum refined to the highest purity 
is as much a product of a hypothesis as it is of observation, If that 
is correct, there is little difference between an empirical datum and a 
damdu.m. 
As an example of a refined empirical datum Pepper cites the concept 
28 
of temperature. The idea of temperature begins with ordinary common-
27Waismann, p. 483, 
28 . WH, pp. 53-57. Cf. ~I, pp. 138-139, 
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sense feelings of hotness and coldness as we touch objects. A first 
refinement of the concept might be made on the basis of (1) a comm.on-
sense correlation that it is possible to bring two bodies into contact 
and experience no change in the hotness of either body (notice here the 
implicit introduction of the hypothesis that heat in an external body is 
something which somehow causes the sensation of temperature). If when a 
piece of steel which feels cooler, is placed in contact with a piece of 
wood which feels warmer, and if no difference is felt in their individ-
ual heat, then their heats may be said to be equal. Another refinement 
may be made on the basis of (2) another correlation, viz.: the volume of 
a body generally expands upon heating. An instrument is constructed by 
means of which this correlation is controlled and standardized into a 
reading on a scale. After this point, further refinement comes in the 
perfecting of more precise instruments. When all this is finished, to 
find the temperature of a body one need merely place the instrument 
against it and read the pointer (note the implicit association of tem:-
perature as·a sensation with temperature read from an instrument). The 
pointer reading is the completely refined empirical datum. 
rt will be helpful to separate two aspects of the notion of an 
empirical datum. There is, first, the observational side. One may look 
t t th t II • t t t . t X II a a me er, en repor poin er a quan 1 y . He may corroborate 
that reading by either checking it again himself several times, or he 
may ask another person (or many other perso,ns) to read the meter and 
... 
. report their findings. If in all cases the meter is read at X, then 
several things have been confirmed with high probability: (1) the first 
individual by repeating his own observations eliminates the possibility 
of having misread the meter; (2) by asking others to read the meter he 
further strengthens that belief plus eliminating the chance that there 
is something wrong with his senses; (3) agreement by all who have read 
the meter that it is at X decreases the possibility of fraud. If all 
this is what Pepper.means by multiplicative corroboration in the sense 
of a refined empirical datum, there can be no quarrel with him. This 
being true, what Pepper calls an empirical datum is nothing more than a 
well-attested observation statement; and multiplicative corroboration 
consists only in the three processes of attestation listed above, Multi-, 
plicative corroboration, then, simply provides assurance against fraud, 
hallucination and human inaccuracy. But Pepper wants empirical data and 
multiplicative corroboration to do more which leads to the second aspect 
Pepper wants empirical data to have significance of their own. He 
wants "The meter is at x" to mean that "The temperature is X." But, 
this operation introduces a hypothesis. Observation statements are 
lacking in significance unless an explanatory hypothesis is provided. 
In multiplicative corroboration a similar situation persists. If 
Pepper wants it to include the ability to refine, as he apparently does, 
then he ought to admit the part played by hypothesis in that process. 
In the temperature example there are at least three places where hypo-
theses were tacii:ily used: the two correlations mentioned and the step 
of "perfecting the instrument." Thus, when several people :read a meter 
and say "the temperature is X," the interpretation added to the raw ob-
servation statement is due to several hypotheses: (1) that temperature 
is an effect of heat; (2) that heat is correlated with expansion; 
(3) that the mechanical or electrical meter movement is directly tied 
in with the source of heat in such a way that it is "reading" the 
quantity of heat (included in this are all the various theories of 
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electrical or mechanical systems). This implies that multiplicative 
corroboration of this second kind is really a special kind of structural 
corroboration--a kind involving the convergence of several different 
observations (all of the same object in this case, but different obser-
vations nonetheless) toward one result, namely the confirmation of the 
hypotheses which refine, interpret, correlate, the empirical datum. 
Logical~- There are some further difficulties in Pepper's 
second type of refined data, logical data. He limits the principal 
kinds of logical data to three but gives no reason why adjunction, for 
instance, is a more primary or important operation than the operations 
of separate assertion, joint assertion, and implication which it incor-
porates. How could one assent to the simplicity and obviousness of an 
adjunctive operation without first grasping the other three concepts 
mentioned? Adjunction is not as simple a process as it first appears. 
If someone replies that it is unnecessary to proceed to the level of the 
more basic concepts before adjunction becomes simple and obvious, let 
him try to explain it to a group of inquisitive freshmen without first 
discussing at least some of the more basic ideas. 
There is a more notable source of confusion in the notion of logi-
cal data as a particular set of "simple and obvious" operations by which 
transitions occur in logical and mathematical systems. A science like 
mathematics is deductive if it proves subsequent propositions by deduc-
ing them ultimately from unproved postulates ustng accepted logical 
techniques. Similarly, one may develop a propositional calculus from a 
set of postulated principles which will enable one to test arguments and 
perform other useful applications of reasoning. Both illustrations are 
examples of logical systems--bodies of knowledge organized by ext:ra-
systemic deductive logic (logical data if you will). But, neither of 
these examples are systems of logic. " . " They each depend upon ordinary 
logic for their development. They assume logic without specifying what 
logic is, without stating what the principles of inference are. Pepper 
says that these principles of inference are logical data, which are 
"Substitution," "Adjunction," and "Inference." 
It is possible to have a science or deductive system of ~ogic which 
will have deduction itself as its subject matter. Systems of this kind 
are referred to as logistic systems. 29 Briefly, any logistic system 
contains the following elements: (1) a list of primitive symbols plus 
symbols defined in terms of them, these being the only symbols allowed 
within the system; (2) a purely syntactical (formal) criterion for 
dividing sequences of symbols into those which are well formed formulas 
(wffs) and those which are not; (3) a list of unproved wffs assumed as 
postulates; (4) a purely syntactical criterion for di vi ding sequences 
of wffs into valid and invalid arguments; (5) a purely formal criterion 
for distinguishing between theorems and nontheorems of the system. 30 
Using a well known logistic system identified as RS (Rosser' s Sy·s-
tern), let us determine where Pepper's three principal logical data fit 
into it. The logical datum called Inference is assumed in R,S as the 
only primitive operational rule (Rl) used for legitimizing arguments. 
Rule Rl plus the definition of a "demonstration of validity" constitute 
t t " " he ma erials needed for understanding the con~epts proof and. 
"theorem, 1131 In RS Pepper 1 s Adjunction is a Derived Rule of Inference; 
29Irying M. Copi, Symbolic Logic, (New York, 1965), p. 184 . 
. 3oibid., P- 187 ~. 
3libid., pp. 206-2<13; p, 219. 
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Substitution is developed as a Meta theorem, 32 Thus; in F.S only one of 
Pepper's logical data was required as a part of the five above essen--
tials for a logistic system, the other two logical data being deriva-
tive. RS is expressively complete with respect to the subject matter of 
truth-functional propositional logic techniques. 
• II II Even the logical datum Inference may not be required for the 
development of an adequate logistic system. There are many different 
logistic systems equally as adequate as RS. The difference lies in that 
they start with different particular means of fulfilling the five 
criteria of logistic systems discussed above. The Nicod System (NS) is 
especially pertinent to the present problem.33 NS uses one primitive 
operator symbol) the Peirce stroke function. Most systems use at least 
two undefined operator symbols, There is only one primitive axiom and 
only one primitive operational rule. Since Pepper 1 s logical data are 
supposed to be the simple and obvious modes of logical transition) one 
would expect the primitive operational rule in NS to be one of the three 
types of logical data) but it is not, The underived operational rule in 
NS is: From P and PI (RI Q,) to infer Q,, That this is not the same as 
Pepper's "Inference" is seen from the NS symbolization of Pepper:s In-
ference which is: From P and Pl (Q,JQ,) to infer Q. Neither of the other 
two principal. logical data appear directly in NS; however: they are de'"· 
rivable from it. 
Pepper's three principal logical data thus boil down to a 
32Irving M. Copi) Symbolic Logic): (New York) 1965) : p. 228, 
33rbid.) pp. 260-269, 
preference for the natural language interpretation of three postulated 
34 
rules of a particular logistic system--Lewis' System. It is clear 
that there are operational rules assumed as part of the unproved base 
of every successful logistic system) but in each case they are suffi-
cient conditions) not necessary ones. These assumed rules are not all 
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similar to the three Pepper enumerates) as the Nicod System illustrates. 
The only useful part of the whole idea of logical data as originally 
proposed lies in the five requirements common to all. logistic systems, 
If this is all the remains) the concept of logical. data can be scrubbed, 
because one need not multiply one 1 s technical vocabulary beyond neces-
sity. 
341iewis and Langford) pp. 125-·126. On p. 125 one finds this state-
ment: 11 • • • The importance of the logistic method lies in the fact that 
proofs take place through operations according to precise rules which 
are independent of any logical. significance of the system. The oper·-· 
at ions to be al.lowed [ in our logistic system] are the following: iSu1J,-· 
stitution ... Adjunction .... Inference. 11 In other words.i these three 
have the status of primi ti.ve operationai rules in Lewis' System. 
CHAPTER IV 
THE ROOT METAPHOR THEORY 
Everything to this point would be effectively labelled the pre-
root-;metaphor portion of Mr. Pepper's work. That part is intended as a 
foundation of cognition which he believes would be accepted by anyone 
taking a broad and tolerant approach to this general subject matter. 
Those conclusions [of the pre-root-metaphor portion], and the 
evidence and reasoning on which they are based, are a sort of 
bed-rock of cognition. That utter skepticism and dogmatism 
areself-defeating, that there is common sense, that we do 
have great confidence in data, which numbers of observations 
confirm, and in danda, which large masses of fact confirm-·-
those seem to be minimum conclusions safely acceptable. But 
one may accept those conclusions without accepting the sug-
gestions of this chapter. Here I shall offer a hypothesis 
concerning the origin of world theories ... 1 
One question t)1at immediately comes to mind concerns the standard 
for truth used in the pre-root-metaphor studies. The eclectic theory of 
truth Pepper advocates after the development of the root-metaphor theory 
may depend upon the root-metaphor approach for its correctness. If this 
is so, perhaps Pepper is advocating two standards for truth, It will be 
wise before considering that point to continue with a discussion of the 
root-metaphor theory. 
1 
WH, p. 84. 
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Origin and Development of World Hypotheses 
Professor Pepper's root-metaphor hypothesis is an account of the 
origin of world theories--
... a hypothesis which, if true, shows the connection of these 
theories with common sense, illumines the nature of these 
theories, renders them distinguishable from one another, and 
acts as an ins~rument of criticism for determining their rela-
tive adequacy. 
Pepper believes that world theories can be generated by either of two 
62 
techniques. The first is by elaboration of analogies. The second is by 
permutations of logical postulates. The root-metaphor theory uses the 
former approa~h. 3 Pepper's analogical method of generating world theo-
ries is this: 
What I call the root metaphor theory is the theory that a 
world hypothesis to cover all facts is framed in the first 
instance on the basis of a rather small set of facts and then 
expanded in reference so as to cover all facts. The set of 
facts which inspired the hypothesis is the original root meta-
phor. It may be a ghost, or water, or air, or mutability, or 
qualitative composition, or mechanical push and pull, or the 
life history of youth, maturity, and age, or form and matter, 
or definition and similarity, or the mystic experience, or 
sensation, or the organic whole, or temporal process. Some 
of these facts in the course of expansion may prove adequate, 
others not. At first they are accepted as they.are found in 
uncriticized fact. How else could they be found? They are 
generally dog~atically assumed to be self-evident and indubi-
table. They are cognitively digested and analyzed. Their 
structure is·usually found capable of rather wide extension 
through uncriticized facts not at first supposed to be of 
their nature. This structure .is then elevated . into an hypo-
thesis for the explanation of other uncriticized facts, as a 
result of which these become critically interpreted in terms 
of the root metaphor. In the course of this interpretation, 
the root metaphor itself may undergo critical analysis and 
refinement which reciprocally increases its range and power 
of interpretation. When it assumes unlimited range, or world-
wide scope, then it ·is a metaphysieal hypothesis, and a. 
2WI-I, p. 84. 
3 
v. WI-I, pp. 87-91. 
catalogue of its principal descriptive concepta is a set of 
metaphysical categories. That is the theory. 
From expansion of root metaphors, over the centuries several fairly 
adequate world hypotheses have been developed which have a maximum of 
scope and precision. These are four in number and are named by Pepper 
as Form.ism, Mechanism, Contextualism, and Organicism. 5 Pepper believes 
that several important consequences follow from his root metaphor theo-
ry. He lists these consequences as "Maxims." 
Maxim I: "A world hypothesis is determined by its root metaphor. 116 
Although the various individual statements of a single world hypothesis 
maybe given by several different men, because they are all developing 
the same metaphor, the hypothesis, then, is the same. There should be 
some single statement of the theory, its categories, and its root meta-
phor which pictures the theory at its best. World hypotheses are gen-
erated primarily through a refinement of the categories [aspects] of 
their root metaphor, A world theory's adequacy depends on its potenti.-
ality for description and explanation instead of the accumulation of 
actual descriptions. 
The testing of a world hypothesis consists in presenting to it 
.for description types of fact or specimens from di.verse fields 
· of facts, and if it can adequately describe these, we assume 
that it can describe the rest. Experience has made philosophers 
pretty well aware of what are likely to be the hardest facts for 
a· world . theory to handle, and these are at once respectfully 
presented for solution to any young hypothesis that ventures to 
4RTM, p. 369, e:f. WH, p. 91; MM, pp. 262-263; Stephen C. Pepper, 
11. • II (98) Philosophy and Metaphor, The Journal of Philosophy, XXV 1 2 . , pp. 
130-132. 
\r. WH, pp. 141-142; id. RTM, p. 370. 
6WH, p. 96. 
claim.world-wide scope. If the description of these facts 
tolerably well passes criticism, critics scour the universe 
for some other evidence which will break the theory down.7 
Maxim II: "Each world hypothesis is autonomous. 118 This follows 
from the realization that several world hypotheses may be equally ade-
quate, thus autonomous, because no other world theory of greater ade-
quacy is available, so each of the best ones must be about as reliable 
as the other. Pepper lists several corollaries to this maxim. 
(1) It is illegitimate to disparage the factual inter-
pretation of one world hypothesis in terms of the categories 
of another--if both hypotheses are equally adequate. 
(2) It is illegitimate to assume that the claims of a 
given world hypothesis are established by the exhibition of 
the shortcomings of other world hypotheses. 
(3) It is illegitimate to subject the results of struc-
tural refinement (world hypotheses) to the cognitive standards 
(or limitations) of multiplicative refinement. 
(4) It is illegitimate to subject the results of struc-
tural refinement to the assumptions of common sense. 
·(5) It is convenient to employ common-sense concepts as 
bases for comparison for parallel fields of evidence among 
world theories.9 
Maxim III: " . 1110 Eclecticism is confusing. This follows from 
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Maxim II. Since world hypotheses are autonomous, they are mutually ex-
elusive. That means mixing parts of several world hypotheses to form. an 
eclectic world theory would be confusing. That world theories are mutu-
ally exclusive does not mean that each does not interpret all the others., 
including them within its scope. We become aware of their mutual exclu-
si veness by viewing them from the common-sense viewpoint, and by re:mem-· 
bering that the source of world theories is their root metaphor. Since 
7WH, pp. 97-98. 
8 
WH, p. 98, 
9WI{ 
J pp. 98-102. 
lOWH, p. 104. 
there are no better sources of cognitive criticism than the relatively 
adequate world hypotheses, irresponsibly combining aspects of them is 
unfounded, unless one is striving for a new world theory based on a new 
root metaphor. Pepper is opposed to "static" eclecticism, but he thinks 
11d O II 1 t • • • f 1 ynamic ec ec 1.c.1,sm is use u . But both sorts are confusing and can 
only be comprehended by untangling the various root metaphors involved. 
The only saving grace for the dynamic variety is that it is creative, 
occasionally productive of new root metaphors. 11 
Maxim IV: "concepts which have lost contact with their root meta-
. 1112 phors are empty abstractions. This maxim is often known under the 
title "fallacy of hypostatization." A concept is no better than the 
corroborative evidence for it. If it demands respect in its own right, 
hypostatization has begun; 
The several maxims devloped do not provide a standard of adequacy 
for the different pure root-metaphor theories. Since.Pepper believes 
that even the best world theories are inadequate to some degree, the 
question of relative adequacy is an important one. 
How, then, do we discover that a theory is inadequate? By its 
own judgement of its own achievements in attaining complete 
precision in dealing with all facts whatever presented. A 
world theory, in other words, convicts itself of inadequacy. 
By its own logic, or refined canons of cognition, it acknowl-
edges its own short-:-comings in dealing with certain kinds of 
facts. These judgem,ents, once made by the theories themselves, 
can then be compared externally. Theories which show them-
selves up as dealing much less adequately with the world-wide 
11 WH, p. 107, 
12w, p. 113. 
scope of facts than others are said to be relatively inade-
quate; the others, relatively adequateol3 
A world hypothesis may convict itself of inadequate scope as easily. 
. I 
It follows that whenever a world hypothesis makes an appeal to 
1 unreality' (especially as an explanatory or interpretative 
principle), it unwittingly convicts itself of inadequacy, and 
the more definitely it locates its fields of 'unreality' the 
more definitely it shows just where it4falls short of world-
wide scope and factual corroboration.l · 
Pepper proceeds to develop as many pure root-metaphor world hypo-
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theses as he can find in the history of philosophy. He finds six, two 
of which are rejected because of inadequate scope (mysticism, see WH, 
p. 127) and inadequate precision (animism, see WH, p. 120) . The four 
relatively adequate world hypotheses are then developed according to 
their root metaphor and categorial scheme in what Pepper hopes is their 
best form. 
Standards of Truth 
Because the four best world theories have about the same degree of 
d t t · 15 a equacy, no one of ,hem can be the judge of he others. Pepper 1 s 
general stand is for a reasonable post-rational eclecticism. F'or prac-
tical application one must be mindful of the judgements of all four 
rationally justifiable theories. If one wants information on any topic,--
truth, time, universals, causality, society--one must find what each of 
the four alternative world theories can provide in the matter, then act 
l3WH p. 115-116. c,f. Stephen C. Pepper, "Reply to Professor 
Hoekstra, r, The Journal of Philosophy, XLII (1945), pp. 105-108. This 
article will be cited as 11 RPHo 11 
14 
WH, p. 118. ef. RPH, pp. 105-108. 
l5WH, p. 330. 
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as one thinks best. Pepper has followed this procedure very carefully. 
for esthetics in his well~written book, The Basis of Criticism.in the 
.Arts. Tracing out Pepper's theory of truth will provide an example of 
part of this procedure besides serving as a springboard.for the question 
of double standards of truth which was mentioned .earlier. 
Pepper has often stated that truth is cognitive value. 
II 
.'Truth' is the common name given to what is prized in cogni-
tion. 1116 The concept of truth is first encountered in common sense as.a 
dini notion something presumably like "telling just what happened" as 
contrasted to a lie or an error which would be "intentionally or un-
II intentionally saying what did not happen. This unclear field of rough 
common-sense material becomes refined by each of the various structural 
theories of the nature of cognitive value. Each of the four best world 
hypotheses will have as a component one of the better theories of the 
nature of cognitive value. Hence, the nature of truth is variously 
described by the best world hypotheses (e.g. see WR p. 180, or p. 221., 
or p. 268, or p. 308). 
A crucial question thus arises. Presumably the refinement of the 
common-sense rough notion of truth into one of the defi.ni te well-refined 
theories of truth comes about through the working of the root-metaphor 
categories of a definite world hypothesis. That is, met-a-physical cate-
gories must logically precede any well-refined theory of truth because 
it is the categories of some world theory that provide the tools for re·-
finement through structural corroboration of any common-'sense notion, 
16w, p. 343. 'tif. WR, pp. 82-83, p. 86; Stephen C. Pepper, ."on 
the Cognitive Value of World Hypotheses," The Journal of Philosophv, 
XXXIII (1936) , pp, 575-577. 
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truth included.17 The desideratum is a truth theory by which Pepper 
determined that these are true statements: common-sense material as a 
whole is secure in that it is never lacking; a reasonable man is one 
whose attitude in respect to content is guided by the grounds of belief; 
there is nothing cognitively legitimate in utter skepticism; one who 
doubts a proposition holds it in suspended judgement; there are two 
types of corroboration, structural and multiplicative; the persuasive 
force of structural corroboration comes from a mass of convergent evi-
dence upon the same point of fact. These are all examples of proposi-
tions established as true before world hypotheses, root metaphors, or 
categories were discussed. This strongly suggests that Pepper implicit-
ly used a theory of truth to develop his views on common-sense material) 
types of corroboration, types of evidence, the nature of dogmatism, the 
nature of skepticism, types of hypotheses, and the root-metaphor theoryo 
This personal theory of truth (personal epistemology would be a better 
description) is not gotten in the way Pepper recommends--through post-
rational eclecticism. A suggesti.on as to the source of Pepper 1 s per-
sonal epistemology will be raised shortly. As to what its nature might 
be, one could reasonably speculate that it is the particular viewpoint 
explicitly stated in some of his earlier work, a position which looks 
very much like his present conception of structural corroboration: 
..• this is :my theory of truth. A singular proposition or its 
equivalent is true if the symbols from which it starts are able, 
by following out their references unimpeded, to reach a simul-· 
taneous satisfaction in some object. . . .A universal proposi-
tion involving similarity is true under varying conditions., 
these conditions depending on the nature of the universal pro-
position. But the following general conditions hold for the 
17To confirm that this function of categories is Pepper 1 s view see 
WR, p. 91, pp. 328-329. 
truth of any universal proposition: (1) certain symbols in 
the propositions must refer indifferently to any of a number 
of objects. (2) These objects must be capable under proper 
circumstances of producing a convergent response [italics 
mine, not Pepper's]. G) There must be certain other symbols 
in the proposition referring to the convergent response. The 
proposition is true if conditions (1) and (3) can be satisfied 
by condition (2) . Take the proposition I All men are mortal. ' 
The subject fulfills condition (1) the predicate condition G). 
T~e possibility of witnessing a battle or a mass execution, if 
these be regarded as fair samples of the observation of any 
number of men dying, would fulfill condition (2) ..•. The 
theory I have been describing has many affinities with a prag-
matic theory df truth [he continues to state what is incorrect 
about the pragmatist approach].18 
Having established that there is a personal theory of truth sub-
terranean to Professor Pepper's work, it is time to ask from whence this 
theory came. Pepper has provided the answer when he stated that a theo-
ry of truth is generated from common-sense material by the categories of 
a world hypothesis. 19 That means there is likely to be a subterranean 
metaphysical theory· beneath the subterranean epistemology. Parts of the 
categorial scheme of that theory may be suggested in the quotation im-
mediately preceding. Another reason for believing that there is a tacit 
metaphysical theory underlying Pepper's work is provided by another of 
his earlier papers in which he makes this statement (which seems cor-
rect): 11There is no legitimate way of segregating fact from theory 
except within a theory, and then the facts within that theory are the 
concrete reflections of the abstract theory. 1120 Pepper has tried to 
18stephen C. Pepper, "Truth by Continuity, 11 University of Cal.i.-
fornia Publications in Philosophy, X (1928), pp. 57-58, This quotation 
does not do complete justice to the theory as put forth in the whole 
article. It was not intended to do so. The quotation serves the pur-
pose of indicating what might be a direction for speculating about the 
nature of what has been suggested to be Pepper's personal epistemology. 
19 WH, pp. 342-343. 
20 M&F, p. 12. 
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,describe the philosophical situation in metaphysics.£§. it, is. He has 
tried to be neutral in doing this. The above note about fact-theory 
relationships (and other statements he has made about the function of 
metaphysical theories) should have convinced him that one gets nowhere 
in critical cognitive work without a logicaily prior categorial scheme. 
This brings up the question about why Pepper failed to make his 
underground theories explicit as best he could. One would be guessing 
in the dark if he tried to answer that question completely. In some 
ways the question is loaded. Nevertheless it leads to a very important 
issue concerning what Pepper thought he was doing in World Hypotheses 
and allied work. Pepper objects to the "traditional" attitude of ex-
pecting an unquestionable criterion of truth and factuality to be at 
· 21 
hand. He regards the central theme of World Hypotheses to be the 
opposite of this uncri ti.cal "traditional" attitude. He urges that the 
only attitude justifiable in cognition is that of expecting that every 
cognitive element will need evidence to support it. He thinks that we 
need evidence to establish what is evidence. He advocates this because 
he is convinced of the cognitive unworthiness of dogmatically building 
on certainties. But then in this new, nontraditional approach he pro-
ceeds to state many true propositions (see above, p. 68) which depend 
on a tacit theory of truth which in turn depends on a tacit metapb~sical 
scheme. Also it has been established that dogmatism is less fearful 
than he thinks it to be (see above, pp. 31-35) . 
Pepper wanted to be neutral metaphysically so he could describe and 
diagnose the discipline of metaphysics. One can't do that because, 
21RPH, pp. 101-102. 
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logically speaking, before a "fact" can be described or diagnosed, one 
must have a metaphysical scheme. Before one criticizes one must possess 
an instrument of criticism. 
The previous discussion of dogmatism also implies that Pepper 1 s 
opinion about the nature of the "traditional" cognitive procedure is 
somewhat misdirected. It is not correct that the '\raditional11 attitude 
~f one can even talk of such a unified entity) expects an unquestion-
able criterion of truth and factuality to be at hand. Many philosophers 
in their methodology have begun, by stating, as explicitly as possible, 
what their instruments of criticism are. They propose this undogmat-
ically as the best theory of criticism (or categorial scheme) that they 
have been able to develop. If another person thinks he has a better 
one, the first man willingly listens and if convinced changes his criti-
cal methods. Just because the first man uses words like "indubitable" 
or "certain" does not brand him as a dogmatist. The metaphysicians 
Pepper labels "dogmatic" are advocates of categorial principles. 
Pepper 1 s confusion that empirical evidence can "disprove" categorial 
principles is the source of his mistaken dogmatist charge. One would be 
dogmatic if one were unwilling to listen to others talk about one 1 s 
ideas, or if one were unwilling to change one 1 s position. Whenever one 
begins discussing experience in a critic al manner,, he has already in-
corporated a theory of critici.sm. This verity seems unclear to Pepper. 
Having begun to discuss experience (of which the subject matter of 
metaphysics is a part), a more thorough philosopher will do his best to 
make explicit the categorial scheme that is logically prior to his 
critical exposition of experience. 
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The Question of Adequacy 
Pepper's· standards of adequacy are attempts to provide an objective 
standard by which one may choose between competing metaphysical systems. 
If he. is successful in this, he will have provided a decision procedure 
for metaphysics. Scope, precision and internal consistency are the 
three criteria he proposes for "testing" a world hypothesis. A world 
theory "convicts itself" of inconsistency and inprecision. Inadequate 
• t h ld th 1 t II l' t II h • t scope is apparen wen a wor eory appea s o unrea 1 y, or wen 1 
. can't handle a set of facts presented to it. 
These standards for adequacy arise from Pepper's opinion about the 
cognitive status of the subject matter of metaphysics. It has just been 
demonstrated that having a well-developed opinion on the cognitive 
status of metaphysics is tantamount to having a metaphysics or catego:r-
ial scheme. Any complete world hypothesis, si.nce it is unlimited in 
scope, must include an interpretation of the cognitive status of meta-
physics. Part of the question of the nature of metaphysics is the 
question of a decision procedure for accepting or rejecting metaphysical 
"theories." Every well-developed world hypothesis advocates a different 
decision procedure for choosing between metaphysic a 1 systems. Why 
should Pepper's categorial system be any better than that proposed by 
any other refined world theory? Pepper's personal metaphysics has re-
mained tacit throughout his criticism of world hypotheses. It is 
submitted that the outcome of his analysis of metaphysics is a reflec-
tion of his own metaphysical position. 
S P 1 , t t • II d II d ' • d • uppose epper rep ies ha his a equacy ec1s1on proce ure is a 
result of looking objectively at the facts of just how things are cog-
nitively in the discipline of metaphysics. In rebuttal it is submitted 
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that the question of what the "facts" are is exactly what metaphysics is 
all about. There is no general agreement among metaphysicians about 
what the facts are. Part of these facts about which there is no agree-
ment are the facts about decision procedures for metaphysical "theories~' 
The decision of greatest significance in metaphysics is an individ-
ual one. An individual who becomes aware of competing metaphysical 
systems makes the final decision. He chooses his categorial system 
based on no publically authenticated and generally accepted decision 
procedure. The reasons for an individual's choice are many and no doubt 
varied. It is possible that there may be no overarching reasons common 
to all who consciously make such a choice. However, one possible area 
for further exploration of reasons for such choices would be one 1 s cul-
22 tural background. 
22Executing such a proposal is beyond the limit of this essa;_v. It 
is mentioned because the relatively new discipline of anthrqpology shows 
promise for some interesting work in this matter, 
CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSION 
Nowhere in the preceding discussions has there appeared an outline 
of Pepper's general argument in support of his approach to metaphysics. 
That will now be provided. His starting point is the recognition of 
1 
metaphysical systems as objects existing in the world. They are dis-
tinguishable from other kinds of systematic arrangements of knowledge by 
the \l.nrestricted way in which they attempt to deal with all of experi-
ence, rather than covering just a portion of experience. He desires to 
study unlimited systems of metaphysics objectively and empirically, He 
thinks that we all believe in and use metaphysical systems, although we 
may not b.e directly aware of them. It takes some effort to look at them 
from a distance. Pepper proposes to treat them as objects in their own 
right; his study bf them is, his attempt to describe each and compare 
them with one another, .while accounting for their nature, their origin, 
and their development. 
Before undertaking that task, Pepper thinks that he must first 
dispose of two cognitive attitudes towards metaphysics--attitudes which 
he believes are unfounded. 2 These two are what he calls dogmatism and 
utter skepticism. After examining these and finding nothing of 
1w, p. 1-2. 
2 WR, p. 3, cf. RTM, p. 365. 
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cognitive value in each, he attempts to steer a more moderate middle 
course between these two extremes. He calls this approach "partial 
skepticism" or "the method of hypothesis." Dogmatism decrees that there 
is only one correct system of metaphysics, excluding all others from 
worth. Utter skepticism holds that none are correct or worthwhile. 
Pepper's middle course involves first taking the attitude that all 
metaphysical systems are hypothetical in the sense that we cannot be 
absolutely sure of the truth of any one, neither can we be certain of 
the falsity or uselessness of all of them. This much Ls implied by the 
rejection of dogmatism and utter skepticism. He does believe that meta-
physical systems form a sort of hierarchy, some having but little value, 
some of middling worth, some being the best available. He further 
believes that he can discov,:::r which systems are more valuable and which 
are less worthwhile. Because of these opinions) he prefers to refer to 
unrestri.cted metaphysical systems as "world hypotheses". 
Professor Pepper rejects the attitudes involved in dogmatism and 
utter skepticism, and he rejects the methods they foster. The only 
method left for employment in metaphysics is the "method of hypothe-
sis."3 His opinion about what constitutes the hypothetical technique 
has been set forth in some detail in the previous chapters O Generall;y, 
understanding his method of hypothesis involves: recognizing that the 
unrestricted hypotheses of metaphysics at first deal with uncriticized 
evidence (dubitanda); grasping the techniques of multiplicative and 
structural corroboration which are the means used for organizing dulJi-
tanda into world hypotheses; understanding (through the root metaphor 
3v. MM, pp. 255-257. 
hypothesis) how world hypotheses originate, how they develop, how they 
may be used. With this outline of Pepper's general argument in mind, 
the task now is to review briefly the detailed criticisms of the pre-
vious chapters and form some general judgements about Pepper's approach. 
Mr. Pepper is basically correct in his characterization of dubi-
tanda as the material with which metaphysical systems deal. Put in 
other terms, human experience is the field which categorial schemes 
interpret. The best categorial systems at least make an effort to 
interpret every kind of experience known to man. However, when one 
commences to state what is the nature of the field of human experience, 
one is applying some set of metaphysical categories. These are necessary 
as interpretative tools in terms of which the description or interpre-
tation will be made. 
His analysis of dogmatism does considerably less than Pepper wanted 
it to do. It falls short of his aspirations as pointed out in the dis-
cussion above. Albeit, Pepper does mount enough evidence to give cred-
ence to his objection that one should not put complete confidence in 
any one metaphysical scheme. One could even say that an attitude of 
tolerance toward competing metaphysical views is a justified result of 
Pepper's analysis of dogmatism. His examination of skepticism is useful 
in a similar way. It successfully shows that one is justified in 
believing that we can possess some kind of knowledge, even though we 
sometimes experience cognitive disappointments. 
The examination of the types of corroboration and the nature 
of hypotheses suggests that the best approach would be to admit that 
metaphy~ics and science operate on different logical levels and with 
differing techni~ues. One should not attempt to make metaphysics 
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scientific in the same sense that chemistry or physics is scientific, 
Metaphysics can be hypothetical only in the sense that a metaphysical 
system can be tentatively proposed--but there the similarity between 
"world hypotheses" and scientific hypotheses ends. 
Although the above discussion of the root metaphor theory has 
indicated disapproval, that theory does contain many worthwhile sug-
gestions. The unuseful portions of the root metaphor theory are mostly 
a result of some of the wrong turns Pepper made in discussing dogmatism, 
types of corroboration, and the nature of hypotheses. For example, the 
four best root metaphors and their categories which Pepper has ernun"" 
erated function in a manner similar to the absolute presupposition or 
categorial principle advocated by this writer (pp. 52 above). The part 
played by analogy in developing categorial schemes has received useful 
attention in Pepper's work. Pepper has done a service for logic by 
pointing out that it, like any other part of hwnan experience, is open 
to interpretation by categorial systems. In that sense each metaphysi-
1 t d h ' t 111 ' II ca sys em oes ave is own ogic. 
Final Comments 
It is difficult to envision how it would be possible for anyone to 
discuss critically the subject matter of metaphysics without holding 
some metaphysical presuppositions. Whenever one initiates a discussion 
in philosophy, some kind of categorial presupposition will be present. 
The only way one may avoid using categorial presuppositions in a phi.lo-
sophical discussion is (as Pepper has suggested) to remain silent, 
Metaphysical neutrality in philosophical work appears to be impossible. 
Even outside the realm of philosophy one can find these presuppositions 
in human·activities of many.varieties. The discipline of metaphysics is 
the study of these categorial presuppositions. A categorial scheme or 
system of metaphysics is thus a tool for conceptual interpretation of 
experience. 4 Metaphysics is not involved in getting knowledge of some 
supersensible abode of angelic forms or an unseen collection of micro-
cosmic monads. Metaphysics is the examination of how to interpret, con-
ceptually and rationally, that which we do see, hear, touch, taste, 
smell, remember, dream. Whenever reason itself is the subject of meta-
physical inquiry, the result is a set of categorial principles which 
form the basis of an epistemology. 
There is no generally accepted means for making choices between 
competing metaphysical systems. Neither is there an all-encompassing 
system of metaphysics which judges all the other systems. In general, 
it seems one acquires the system he uses either by cultural transmission 
or by making choices from among the systems with which he has become 
acquainted. The former alternative usually does not involve a conscious 
choice. In this case, one accumulates a categorial system through 
acculturation which is a slow process. Acquiring a categorial system 
through one's culture happens to almost everyone. 
The second general method of acquisition incorporates conscious 
study of various proposed schemes of metaphysics culminating in one 1 s 
• II II 
choice of a best system. This may not be a single final choice, but 
~- I I t · , II cf. Stephen C. Pepper, Three Lee ures on Contemporary Philosophy; 
unpublished lectures delivered at Not re Dame University by Mr. Pepper in 
February of 1967, copy provided by Mr. Pepper's permission, The first 
lecture in this series is entitled "The Search for Comprehension, or 
World Hypotheses." In this lecture Pepper develops the idea that world 
hypotheses are the instruments by which one comprehends experience. 
This seems to be equivalent to the position just stated above. 
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may involve continued choices as study proceeds and more alternatives 
come to view. Study of this kind is associated with studying the his-
tory of metaphysics, discussing metaphysics, and with other activities 
involved in the general traditional discipline of philosophy. The 
standards by which on!;:! chooses . (and continues to choose) between com-
peting categorial schemes remain an individual and quite variable 
affai;r, Not a great deal has yet been said by philosophers about that 
problem. About the most one can say at this point is that such choices 
are very personal and not subject to widely recognized or accepted 
standards of any kind, One philosopher can't force his view on another 
by appealing to some ultimate category of his own view if the question 
under discussion concerns the " " . correct categories. All one can do is 
to exhibit his position as clearly as he can; listen politely while his 
opponent does the same; then try to engage in a penetrating interchange 
5 which usually mutually expands each party's outlook. No one can prove 
·to the other that a specific choice between competing categories is the 
only appropriate one. Persuasion and argumentation may be used, but the 
crucial choice is never proved correct or wrong. 
One problem Pepper has raised is the question of how to regard 
competing categorial systems. Should they be placed in some kind of 
heirarchy, or should they be regarded as roughly equal? It has been 
suggested that interpreting rationally. and critically the subject matter 
of metaphysics requires categorial principles or metaphysical pre-
suppositions. In regard to the question raised here, then, the answer 
5 ~H, Stephen C. Pepper, "A Contextualistic Theory of 
University of California Publications in Philosophy, XVII 
p. 183. 
P "b"l't " OSS1. l l Y, 
(1934) , 
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is that whether one regards competing metaphysical systems as equal or 
graduated depends on one's personal metaphysical position--a position 
arrived at by some initial and private choice. The best one can do is 
to give his opinion on the subject matter of metaphysics as clearly as 
possible, exhibiting as explicitly as he can the categorial base of his 
view. 
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